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Counterinsurgency scholars and notable counterinsurgents often credit minimum force 
doctrine, among other factors, for British success in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. 
Minimum Force has become a prescriptive element for counterinsurgency warfare as a 
result, often with the understanding that gaining and retaining the population’s “hearts 
and minds” is crucial to achieving victory. Also, minimum force proponents claim 
excessive force is anathema to that goal, insofar as it alienates the population and 
delegitimizes the government’s efforts. Minimum force, however, was never a central 
component of British counterinsurgencies during the decolonialization era following 
World War II, and its continued inclusion among counterinsurgency formulas is 
unwarranted based on British experiences. The British relied primarily on coercion, 
reprisals, exemplary force, and forced relocations—tactics learned during the Irish War 
of Independence (1919–1921) and subsequent limited wars to starve the insurgents of the 
population’s support. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Minimum force allegedly forms the bedrock principle of British 
counterinsurgency successes in the twentieth century. The idea of minimum force took 
root in the British army and Colonial Office in the wake of World War I, as 
counterinsurgency transitioned from “small wars” to “imperial policing.” The disastrous 
handling of the Amritsar massacre of 1919 when British troops opened fire on a peaceful 
political protest killing approximately 1000 people, followed by the Irish Troubles 
(1919–1921), and the growth of nationalist movements in British colonial possessions in 
the inter-war years required a new doctrine that was more sensitive to public opinion and 
recognized the political nature of opposition to British rule. In the inter-war years, Sir 
Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing (1934) and Colonel H.J. Simson’s 1937 book British 
Rule and Rebellion, both of which became staff college staples into the 1950s, argued 
that the British Empire was witnessing a new type of conflict in which the political 
challenges blurred the traditional frontiers between peace and war. For this reason, the 
application of military force had to be made to conform to these new political realities 
and to the requirements of public opinion. Military force had henceforth to be 
constrained, guided by the civil authorities, preferably to supplement and reinforce the 
police rather than supersede them. “Aide to the civil power,” the doctrine that now 
shaped British counterinsurgency, emphasized minimum force applied within the 
constraints of the law. In the post–World War II era, the idea of “aide to the civil power” 
and minimum force was reinforced by Sir Robert Thompson’s 1966 book Defeating 
Communist Insurgency, a book that extrapolated “lessons” based on Britain’s success in 
Malaya (1948–1960), supplemented by the writings of General Sir Frank Kitson.1  The 
main academic underpinning for the arguments of these counterinsurgency theorists was 
provided by Tom Mockaitis’ British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960. Mockaitis argued 
                                                 
1 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber and Faber, 
1971). 
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that minimum force applied within the legal constraints and directed by civil authorities 
helps to account for numerous British counterinsurgency successes in Malaya, Kenya, 
Northern Ireland, and elsewhere.2 
This thesis will test the accuracy of this view. Its contention is that, far from 
applying a doctrine of minimum force, for most of the Cold War and beyond, British 
counterinsurgents employed free-fire zones, collective punishment, reprisal attacks, mass 
arrests with indefinite detention, extra-judicial killings, and in some cases approved 
bombing of entire villages if their small ground forces failed to achieve tactical victories. 
Many of these actions were taken in defiance of civilian authority as represented by the 
Colonial Office and even Westminster, which the military distrusted as “soft,” 
appeasement minded, and eager to deny that they had a problem until the insurgency has 
assumed devastating dimensions. Rather than back small, underfunded imperial police 
forces considered untrustworthy because they relied on indigenous recruits, the military 
took the lead in operations, or backed racist settler militias intent on carrying out 
pogroms against the natives, as was the case in both Malaya and Kenya. Given these 
realities, this thesis will ask how the doctrine of minimum force evolved from 1919, 
through the colonial policing period of the interwar years, into the era of 
decolonialization in a manner anathema to the concepts of minimum force, as well as the 
factors that prevented adherence to it in order to determine the validity of minimum force 
as a prescriptive element. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
As a result of Britain’s (increasingly disputed) record of success in 
counterinsurgency operations, minimum force has become a prescriptive component of 
low intensity or counterinsurgency doctrine. Because many military commanders look to 
lessons of history, for better or worse, to guide the development and execution of 
operational plans and tactical behavior, understanding the context of minimum force and 
its origins and application since the Second World War remains important to militaries 
that attempt to adopt the modern version of it in the execution of counterinsurgency 
                                                 
2 Tom Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960 (London:  Macmillan, 1990). 
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operations. British counterinsurgency successes, such as they were, were not a result, 
even in part, of the current understanding of minimum force. Nevertheless, some 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) experts, such as General David Petraeus in his authorship of 
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency and General Stanley McChrystal in his restrictive rules of 
engagement in Afghanistan, treat minimum force as a political tool designed to win 
“hearts and minds” through the behavior of soldiers. FM 3-24 argues that, if properly 
treated, populations in insurgent-infested areas must side with counterinsurgents based on 
calculated self-interest. The assumptions are essentially those of Gwynn, Simson, 
Thompson, and Kitson—that the population is apolitical, passive, and pressured to act by 
bad actors in their midst.3 If the population can be “protected” and won over by “hearts 
and minds” methods, the insurgency will become isolated and subsequently wither. The 
counterinsurgent notion – the mirror-image of Mao—is “the people” are both the prize 
and the determinate of success in counterinsurgency operations. Popular support is won 
in part through financial favors bestowed on indigenous leaders or factions who agree to 
support the counterinsurgents, but primarily by remaining “friendly” and limiting the use 
of force to gain legitimacy.4  This thesis will argue that proportionality of force and 
“hearts and minds” tactics were notable by their absence in British counterinsurgency 
operations both before and after World War II. For this reason, contemporary 
counterinsurgents who base their doctrines on an erroneous understanding of the nature 
of British counterinsurgency “success” are bound to be misled.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
One source of the misunderstanding of the concept of minimum force as it has 
been applied in British counterinsurgency doctrine is that the British definition of “legal” 
behavior has proven to be increasingly at odds with the evolution of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) over the last century. In fact, it has proven easy for British jurists 
                                                 
3 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber and Faber, 
1971); Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (MacMillan and Co.: London, 1936); H.J. Simson, British 
Rule and Rebellion (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1937). 
4 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, December 2006), 1-28, 5-22, 7-7, D-2. 
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and soldiers to ignore IHL and define their own legal framework for counterinsurgency 
operations with the argument that IHL is designed for conventional war between 
uniformed combatants of sovereign nations, or in the case of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) of September 1953, to prevent a future Holocaust, not to deal 
with insurgencies organized among populations by criminals and terrorists. While the 
British government did not ratify the 1949 Geneva Conventions until 1957, it did purport 
to adhere to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, as well 
as the ECHR, all of which served similar purposes regarding the treatment of civilians. 
However, as David French points out, the British would either ignore provisions which 
they found inconvenient, delay ratification of ostensibly restrictive international 
agreements such as Geneva, or use more permissive articles in the ECHR to justify 
behavior that was discouraged in other conventions.5   The truth, however, is that the 
British refusal to adhere to international standards of human rights has “tactized” their 
strategies, delegitimized their operations in the public mind, and led at the very least to a 
prolongation of insurgencies (Northern Ireland) when it has not delegitimized them 
altogether—Palestine (1946–1947), Cyprus (1955–1960), and Aden (1964–67). Scholars 
have also revealed in recent years that the British army’s signature counterinsurgency 
“successes” in Malaya (1948–1960) and Kenya (1952–1960) were won by using methods 
that far exceeded minimum force and legal constraints. The British government 
designated insurgents as criminals, therefore outside the purview of ratified IHL, to avoid 
adhering to the new standards of lethal force, population controls, forced labor, and 
collective punishment. They evoked article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights during the so-called Mau Mau uprising in Kenya which allowed them to ignore its 
provisions if they faced an insurrection.6  
A second constraint on the application of minimum force can be found in the 
character of civil-military relations during Cold War insurgencies insofar as the colonial 
authorities and settlers prevented general adherence to minimum force. Military aid to 
                                                 
5 David French, The British Way in Counter Insurgency, 1945–1967 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 230 
6 Ibid., 231. 
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civil power in colonial wars often found the character of operations influenced by a 
committee of British principals, stakeholders, and settlers, who insisted upon coercive 
methods and lethal force because of the personal stake they held in the land and the 
inherent racism that underpinned colonial rule. Additionally, these governments raised 
local forces that, although often led by ethnically British officers, were not held to the 
same standards of behavior in battle or accountability in their treatment of non-
combatants. In other words, the concepts of legality and minimum force “went native.” 
Another hypothesis concerns the absence of minimum force practice among the 
operational and tactical leadership of both British military and police forces. Much like 
the British soldiers in Ireland from 1919–21 who were mostly veterans of the Great War, 
the Cold War soldiers were perhaps inexperienced altogether in counterinsurgency, or 
who like the senior World War II veterans, were principally focused on conventional 
operations and the prospect that they may reoccur in Europe in the 1950–1960 timeframe. 
In this case, minimum force was contrary to prior experience in and training for major 
combat operations, and they were suddenly expected to behave differently under 
dissimilar circumstances. Likewise, the idea that military force was moderated in 
counterinsurgency because it was deployed in support of the British colonial police forces 
also proved a misconception. British colonial police forces were militarized organizations 
modeled on the Royal Irish (and after 1921 the Royal Ulster) Constabulary. The RIC and 
RUC, which lived in barracks, drilled according to military manuals, and whose job was 
to keep an eye on Britain’s potentially, and on occasion actively, disloyal Irish Catholic 
subjects, became the models for the Palestinian police, whose coercive paramilitary 
policing formed the nucleus of colonial police forces in Malaya, Kenya, Guiana, Cyprus, 
and elsewhere, supplemented in Malaya and Kenya in particular by racist settler 
auxiliaries. Attempts by civilian and on occasion by military leadership to reform their 
harsh methods were ignored by the police or otherwise proved ineffectual given an 
organizational culture of racism, reprisals, coercion, and an absence of effective 
mechanisms of accountability. Because the military and police forces lacked 
counterinsurgency training and were undisciplined, the proposed doctrine of minimum 
 6
force could not be reconciled to the security forces’ primitive and brutal responses to 
enemy activity. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the literature regarding British COIN focuses on the evolution and 
application of a doctrine of “minimum force” first introduced in Sir Charles Gwynn’s 
1934 Imperial Policing in reaction to the post–World War I disasters of Amritsar and the 
Troubles that led to the independence of Eire in 1921, both of which provided the tactical 
and operational foundation for the post–World War II British counterinsurgency 
doctrine.7  For the period of “sub-war,” or armed insurrection prior to World War II, 
Imperial Policing and H.J. Simson’s British Rule and Rebellion(1937) provide the 
narratives for an examination of the British responses to several inter-war insurgencies 
although, the level of detail for key events, their level of success and impact on civil-
military relations varies greatly.8  Gwynn and Simson’s books were staples of officer 
corps training in the period leading up to the wars of decolonialization and therefore 
influenced the theory of force application for counterinsurgents of the post–World War II 
era. Moreover, these books reflected a change in the popular views from C.E. Callwell’s 
Small Wars, which advocated burning villages to punish the “savage” enemy, insofar as 
they acknowledged that the population in a colonial insurgency consisted of British 
subjects with a modicum of civic and legal rights.9 
Many modern COIN scholars treat minimum force as a de facto ROE—a 
principle guiding operations regardless of its absence from official documents and a 
history of atrocities, violations of the law of war (despite lacking ratification of some 
international agreements), confusion over the limits of population control measures, the 
definition of “minimum” force in practice, or a combination of all of the above. Hew 
Strachan10, Huw Bennett11, Rod Thornton12, Thomas Mockaitis13, Bruno Reis,14 David 
                                                 
7Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 13–15. 
8 H.J. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1937). 
9 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: General Staff, War Office, 1906 
reprinted 1914), 23, 40. 
10 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). 
 7
French,15 and others have written extensively on the theory versus the reality of British 
COIN.   
The debate about absolute or relative minimum force reveals considerable 
impediments to the application of each. Reis acknowledges, like the British army COIN 
manual, that minimum force doctrine was an important, if not the “dominant label” of 
British counterinsurgency.16  Reis also acknowledges that the tendency in COIN 
scholarship involves the treatment of minimum force as the “minimum level possible” as 
opposed to Gwynn’s relative force applied according to situational demands.17  Mockaitis 
attributes this revisionism to the changing attitudes toward coercion and even the use of 
force itself—that is, because views of the military and imperialism have become less 
favorable, and information previously unavailable regarding harsh methods applied 
during counterinsurgency operations have come to light, scholars have focused on 
indicting the British for crimes that were not illegal at the time or pointing out the 
hypocrisy of a absolute minimum force that did not exist.18  Huw Bennett falls into this 
latter camp, as he questions the centrality of minimum force doctrine given British 
actions in Kenya. He applies the concepts of international law to bolster his argument, 
stating the British violated Geneva Conventions, despite the fact that London ratified the 
Geneva Conventions years following the insurgency’s end.19  Bennett does, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
11Huw Bennett, “The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army 
Counterinsurgency in Kenya,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 4 (2007), 638–664. 
12 Rod Thornton, “The British Army and the Origins of Its Minimum Force Philosophy.” Small Wars 
and Insurgencies 15, no. 1 (2004), 83–106. 
13 Thomas Mockaitis, “The Minimum Force Debate: Contemporary Sensibilities Meet Imperial 
Practice,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 23, no. 4–5 (September 2012), 762–780.   
14 Bruno Reis, “The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns During 
Decolonization (1945–1970),” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (April 2011), 245–279. 
15 David French, “Nasty Not Nice: British Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and Practice, 1945–1967,” 
Small Wars and Insurgencies 23, no. 4–5 (December 2012): 744–761. 
16 Reis, “The Myth of British Minimum Force,” 247; Army Field Manual Volume 1, Combined Arms 
Operations, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines) – Part 10, (Army Code 
71749, July 2001), 3–24. 
17 Reis, “The Myth of British Minimum Force,” 248. 
18 Mockaitis, “The Minimum Force Debate,” 762–763. 
19 Bennett, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 639. 
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show how IHL, especially the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights ratified in 1948 and 
the European Convention on Human Rights of 1953, forced the British government to 
claim that because insurgents were criminals, London was under no obligation to accord 
them humanitarian treatment. At the very least, this was an embarrassment to a British 
government that aimed to project an image of civility and bequeath a legacy of 
“Britishness” to its colonial wards.20  In Malaya, for instance, Templer ran a public-
relations campaign to show the centrality of a magnanimous version of “hearts and 
minds” in the role of neutralizing the insurgency.21 However, emphasizing the role of a 
few public services appeared to be a patent attempt to downplay the role of forced 
relocation of Chinese immigrants to detention camps, sealed off with barbed wire and 
guard towers.22  Rod Thornton, in a reply to Bennett’s article, also adopts a view of 
absolute minimum force, but blames the British excesses on white settlers or locally 
raised forces that were not educated in the same culture of Victorian values nor held to 
the same operational and tactical standards as were regular units.23  In a subsequent reply 
to Thornton, Bennett identifies the primary concern with analyzing minimum force on a 
qualitative or quantitative basis: “As such, the concept is virtually meaningless in 
analytical terms, because it lacks clear criteria for judging when it applies and when it 
does not.”24  The term always applies, if understood in the manner described by Sir 
Charles Gwynn. However, the degree and scope of force is determined by the 
commander on the ground, usually a battalion, company, or squad commander, and is 
therefore likely to be completely arbitrary. Absolute minimum force advocates will more 
likely encounter “excessive violence” in military responses to insurgent provocation, 
Bennett argues.25 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 642–644. 
21 Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–80 
(New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 74 
22 French, The British Way, 175. 
23 Thornton, “Minimum Force: A Reply to Huw Bennett,” 215–216. 
24 Bennett, “Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency,” 466. 
25 Ibid., 468. 
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Studies of British military and police organizational culture demonstrate great 
impediments to the application of minimal violence and to the attempts of some civilian 
and military leaders to impose it. For example, Georgina Sinclair’s At the End of the 
Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945–80 supplements the former 
authors’ focus on the military by discussing the often neglected role of the colonial 
police, specifically in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, , Kenya, and Aden.26While William 
Sheehan27 and D.M. Leeson28 have written detailed accounts of military and police 
tactics during the Irish War of Independence in 1919–21, Sinclair shows how tactical 
violence and reprisals employed by the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Auxiliaries--
former British officers recruited to act as a mobile strike force against IRA insurgents--
permeated the colonial police throughout the empire as RIC veterans and their heirs in the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) were transferred to colonial posts or invited to train 
colonial police forces, a role that devolved in part on the RUC. The Colonial Office made 
multiple attempts to impose a civil policing style with absolute minimum force on the 
colonial police, but the inability or unwillingness of the Colonial Office to micromanage 
the behavior of a force regarded as the colony’s first line of defense, one which required 
military training and organization to carry out its mission, limited the impact of 
reforms.29 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will examine the historical record of the British Army and colonial 
police forces beginning with the 1919 War of Independence and ending with the wars of 
decolonialization following World War II. Chapter II will show the origins of minimum 
force doctrine in Amritsar, India, in 1919 paralleled with the British execution of the Irish 
War of Independence as the default setting of counterinsurgency practice. Chapter III will 
show how those institutional lessons from Ireland were perpetuated and amended to 
                                                 
26 Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–80 
(New York: Manchester University Press, 2006). 
27 William Sheehan, A Hard Local War: The British Army and the Guerilla War in Cork 1919–1921 
(Gloucestershire: Spellmount, 2011).  
28 D.M. Leeson, The Black and Tans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
29Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line, 69–74. 
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include adaptations based on new weapon systems and tactics, leaving Palestine’s 
colonial police as the new standard bearer for British counterinsurgency. Chapter IV will 
examine the manifestation of minimum force doctrine in light of post-WWII international 
laws barring many standard British tactics, and the government’s effort to maintain the 
status quo in spite of those laws. The examination of minimum force in Kenya, Malaya, 
and Cyprus—as putative victories for the counterinsurgents—will show that the 
institutional learning from Ireland and Palestine vis-à-vis coercion and collective 
punishments prevailed over insincere proclamations of minimum force adherence by both 
the civil leadership and the top military practitioners.     
 11
II. THE ORIGINS OF MINIMUM FORCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of minimum force as a central doctrinal tenant conducive to successful 
counterinsurgency operations is largely a myth. This myth has been perpetuated by the 
British government, by noteworthy British counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners 
such as Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson as well as several scholars of 
counterinsurgency like Thomas Mockaitis and John Nagl.30  The myth, however, has a 
basis in reality. What constitutes minimum force”lies in the eye of the beholder. 
Resettlement camps or preventative detention, even collective punishments, can be 
justified in the name of security for the greatest number as a tactic of relative restraint. 
Those on one side of a civil/tribal/ethnic conflict may believe that the other side has 
escaped lightly even when punishments and reprisals rain down upon them. That said, 
there are long-standing standards that lay out permissible behavior in the conduct of 
hostilities—jus in bello—which have been progressively codified since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. These have frequently been ignored in counterinsurgencies for variety 
of reasons, among them racism; the conviction that insurgents are not “lawful 
combatants”; a belief that the populations who hide and supply them need to be taught a 
lesson or simply removed; or to escape civilian oversight of operations among them. For 
these reasons, one premise of this thesis is that minimum force is a myth propagated by 
British counterinsurgents as part of an Information Operations (IO) campaign to sell the 
operation as a moral and legal enterprise to a British and a larger Western public 
skeptical of the value of counterinsurgency endeavors. The British government mandated 
the minimum force doctrine through the Hunter Commission, which investigated the 
1919 Amritsar massacre and declared that in subsequent imperial policing operations, 
                                                 
30 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1966); 
Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber and Faber, 2010); Thomas Mockaitis, British 
Counterinsurgency 1919–60 (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1990); John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005).   
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British forces must use only the minimum force necessary to quell a disturbance.31  Sir 
Charles Gwynn’s 1934 Imperial Policing, required reading in British staff colleges into 
the post–World War II years, argued that this “minimum” level of required force was an 
elastic concept that depended on circumstances.32 
The imprecision of that definition renders minimum force objectively 
meaningless. Historically, the arsenal of tactics available to British counterinsurgents has 
included collective punishment, reprisals, free-fire zones, forced relocation torture, 
preventative/indefinite detention, house destruction, forced labor, summary executions, 
extra-judicial killings, and other refinements of population-centric warfare. Many of these 
tactics have not only been used by the British army, but also by colonial police forces, 
who transmitted them through the Royal Irish Constabulary and its heir since 1922 the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, that trained many colonial policemen throughout the empire. 
As a result, harsh methods were institutionalized both before and after World War II for 
use in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, and other British possessions and 
protectorates. The colonial police, locally raised “auxiliary” police and military forces, 
and to a lesser extent the British army, succeeded in counterinsurgency through 
separating the population from the insurgents through coercion, forced relocation, or food 
controls that aimed literally to starve the insurgents. However, minimum force applied 
only selectively, despite the government’s increased insistence that the doctrine be 
applied more consistently in counterinsurgency operations. Local and international 
media, as well as international humanitarian law, often forced the British government to 
feign compliance with minimum force if the matter could not be avoided, as was the case 
with the delayed ratification of the Geneva Conventions in 1957.33  The extent to which 
Britain violated the limits of minimum force and IHL in its post–WWII 
counterinsurgency campaigns has only recently become obvious as documents have 
become declassified and scholars have looked more closely at the conduct of those 
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campaigns. As a result, the notion that minimum force was central to winning “hearts and 
minds,” or at least preventing the population from siding wholly with the insurgents, has 
been brought into question. If minimum force was not a central tenant of British COIN, 
then the entire basis for success in counterinsurgency operations is brought into question, 
as is the notion that COIN doctrine with its emphasis on persuasion rather than force 
defines a category of warfare distinct from that of conventional operations.   
B. AMRITSAR 
Minimum force doctrine was born out of two post–World War I nationalists 
rebellions—one in India and the other in Ireland. Amritsar, India would provide the 
impetus for the evolution of the “doctrine,” while the Troubles in Ireland would show the 
consequences of failing to use minimum force. On 13 April 1919, General Reginald 
Dyer’s order to fire without constraint upon unarmed civilians gathered unlawfully in 
Amritsar gave birth to minimum force doctrine. On 11 April, Dyer had arrived in the city 
where police had nearly abdicated control to demonstrators protesting the arrests of two 
activists of the Indian Independence Movement.34  The next day, he led a column onto 
the streets and encountered some protesters, but they dispersed after he warned that lethal 
force would be used; Dyer subsequently drew up a warning proclamation stating violence 
would be punished by courts-martial, and all gatherings were prohibited.35  On 13 April, 
the government in Delhi placed the Punjab under martial law, which prohibited political 
demonstrations. The extent to which this proclamation was promulgated in the city 
remains in question. In Imperial Policing, Sir Charles Gwynn acknowledges that 
“General Dyer’s proclamation was read only at points all within the western half of the 
city, as he decided that the heat had become too trying to the escort to allow a complete 
circuit to be made.”36  Dyer received intelligence that locals intended to hold a protest 
meeting at Jillianwala Bagh, a garden near the Golden Temple holy to the Sikhs in the 
afternoon of the 13th. He subsequently led a small force of about fifty soldiers to either 
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prevent or punish the gathering, depending on its progress. The Jillianwala Bagh was a 
depression with high walls and few exits, which became a death trap for those at the 
meeting unable to escape once Dyer gave the order, without warning, to his troops to 
open fire on the crowd. General Dyer estimated the casualty count at approximately 300 
killed, a figure that was later revised to 379 killed and over 1000 wounded (Indian 
nationalists put the figure far higher).37   
In October 1919, the Disorders Inquiry Committee, better known as the Hunter 
Commission after its chairman Lord William Hunter, was convened to investigate the 
disturbances and the British reaction to them. Gwynn’s analysis of the event oscillates 
between the two divergent views of Dyer as savior and villain, noting that “political 
pressure” called for the Hunter Commission’s denunciation of Dyer’s actions despite the 
opposing perception that he prevented a “dangerous situation” from escalating into a total 
revolt in the region.38  The Hunter Commission’s report, however, stated:  “If necessary a 
crowd that has assembled contrary to a proclamation issued to prevent or terminate 
disorder may have to be fired upon; but continued firing upon the crowd cannot be 
justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in other places. The 
employment of excessive measures is as likely as not to produce the opposite result to 
that desired.”39  In a 2004 article, Rod Thorton argues that the Hunter Commission’s 
decision was not the birth of minimum force doctrine, stating that the massacre caused 
such revulsion among the British because national ethics long demanded minimum force 
throughout the Victorian era.40  Of course, the use of concentration camps and other 
draconian methods that targeted the civilian population to crush the Boer resistance in 
South Africa two decades prior to Amritsar, in addition to the harsh methods used by 
counterinsurgents during the Irish Troubles rather contradicts this assertion. Minimum 
force was, before 1919, the exception, not the rule. The lesson of Amritsar for most 
British soldiers was that, despite the fact that Dyer’s actions were upheld by the Army 
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Council, neither this nor the fact that the Punjab had been under martial law in April 1919 
saved Dyer’s career. On the contrary, he had been relieved of command and denied a 
decoration already approved, which sent an unequivocal message of the dangers of 
excessive force, even if events and regulations apparently justified it.  
C. THE TROUBLES 
The 1919–1921 Irish War of Independence and the methods of counterinsurgency 
that crown forces institutionalized on the basis of that experience became doctrine in a 
vacuum of policy and guidance from civil authority, or oftentimes in spite of that 
guidance. The British counterinsurgency in Ireland was an atypical colonial insurgency 
for several reasons:  the proximity of Ireland allowed Sinn Fein, the Irish independence 
party, to publicize more effectively the coercive nature the British military and police 
actions, and take advantage of the British legal system in securing recompense or 
avoiding conviction through rendering courts ineffective or inoperative. The Irish, like 
the Boers, were also white, which put them in a category different form other imperial 
subjects and more likely to elicit popular sympathy in an era when it was less likely to be 
extended to colonial peoples of color. Finally, the Troubles played out in the wake of 
World War I when publicizing the barbarity, both real and imagined, of the German 
occupation of Belgium had been a central pillar of the Allied propaganda campaign to 
elicit support for the Allied cause. The notion that British law enforcement could behave 
with a degree of barbarity hitherto associated with the Hun shocked British public 
opinion. Thomas Mockaitis explains the failure of the British counterinsurgency in 
Ireland thusly:  “The British defeat in Ireland stemmed in large measure from a failure to 
exercise restraint in a conflict that occurred in a window front. This failure to apply 
rigorously the principle of minimum force resulted in turn from a misunderstanding of 
the nature of the Irish struggle. From the War Office to the common soldier, the army 
believed that it was fighting a war, not quelling disturbances.”41  By 1921, however, Sinn 
Fein and the IRA were close to defeat when the government capitulated and began 
negotiating terms of the truce. The government did occasionally insist upon minimum 
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force in the execution of offensive operations and denied requests to implement more 
draconian measures, like concentration camps, in Ireland. It is also true that army units 
curtailed reprisals, but this was done mainly in the attempt to restore discipline which 
became frayed once soldiers were unleashed on the population. It is equally the case that 
police forces composed of the RIC and Auxiliary Division (“Auxies” or ADRIC), and 
attached soldiers fought a war of vicious coercion and retaliation. Crown forces lost the 
struggle because Sinn Fein forced the British government to the negotiating table and 
secured a truce. But not before crown forces basically thwarted every tactical challenge 
thrown up by the IRA, forcing the IRA to regress back to terrorism. Perhaps for the first 
time, successful tactical repression by crown forces because of its brutality gained 
sympathy for the insurgency both among the populations of Ireland and Great Britain, 
which led to strategic failure. But the take away from Ireland, one passed on to 
subsequent generations of security forces throughout the empire, was that repressive, 
even brutal tactics, were effective. The problem lay with domestic public opinion that, 
repelled by the barbarity required to win counterinsurgency operations, pressured the 
government to surrender.  
Early in the conflict, the Army imitated the RIC in carrying out unofficial 
reprisals on the population in response to IRA attacks. However, realizing that this was 
having an adverse effect on the population, somewhat taken aback by the excesses of the 
RIC reinforced by the so-called Black and Tans and especially the Auxiliary forces, and 
concerned that discipline was eroding in the ranks as reprisals became the order of the 
day, the Army leadership worked to curtail extra-legal practices. This would suggest 
recognition of the benefits of the principles of minimum force. The truth of the matter, 
however, is less noble but far less severe and pervasive than Sinn Fein propaganda led 
many to believe—to this day, the popular understanding of the Troubles involves the 
repeated excesses of force by an army of occupation, sanctioned by the government, 
which relied upon brutality to neutralize the insurgents. Unofficial reprisals by the army 
were usually the result of alcohol coupled with the death of a comrade or affronts to 
female companions. In the cases of a soldier’s death, the army often became frustrated 
with a lack of justice from the local courts, if any inquiry were held at all. General 
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Macready, the Commander in Chief in Ireland, understood the police and army’s resort to 
reprisals, because the judicial system had completely broken down under intimidation 
from the IRA:  
Formerly, in Ireland, if a police officer were murdered there was no 
thought of direct reprisals in the mind of the RIC. They thought only of 
justice, confident that they would be dealt with quickly and adequately by 
the courts. But now the machinery of the law having been broken down, 
they feel there is no certain means of redress and punishment, and it is 
only human that they should act on their own initiative.42 
In September of 1919, members of the IRA attacked a church procession of 
soldiers of the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, seizing weapons and killing one Private 
William Jones, who was approximately one week away from being discharged and 
marrying his fiancée.43  The Fermoy jury failed to convict the accused murderers, 
aggravating an already vengeful disposition among the soldiers. After a night of some 
drinking, the soldiers and a handful of NCOs began to riot in the town, destroying 
windows, and targeting places of business while town locals looted the newly vented 
stores. A junior officer of the regiment later wrote in his memoirs, “The troops had 
worked out a splendid plan. First they send a screen ahead of the main body to clear the 
streets, ordering everybody who was on foot into their houses to stay there. Then a 
demolition party proceeded to every shop and place of business of the members of the 
jury who had brought in their infamous verdict.”44 The violence was neither 
indiscriminate nor intentionally physically abusive toward individuals, although one 
report indicated several civilians were hurt by broken glass and errant missiles.45  The 
soldiers aimed to punish the jury members not by harming them or their families directly, 
but by targeting their financial interests and property. Subsequent unofficial reprisals by 
the army, however, were more violent with less discrimination in targeting. The lack of 
discipline, and not necessarily the reprisals themselves, would cause the Army leadership 
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to restore discipline by forbidding the reprisals and instituting some preventative 
measures.   
The population, too, learned that taunting soldiers didn’t pay. For example, on 
November 9, 1919, residents in the city of Cork exchanged shouts and blows with 
soldiers over access to the local women. The RIC arrived shortly afterward and ordered 
the soldiers to disperse. However, a group of civilians followed the soldiers, taunting 
them en route to the barracks, which caused the soldiers to charge the crowd, 
necessitating a second intervention by the RIC.46 In the towns of Bandon and Cobh, the 
soldiers took to the streets destroying primarily property, this time setting fire to 
buildings and also targeting the housing areas of the poor, which William Sheehan, in A 
Hard Local War, blames on the soldiers’ ignorance regarding the town’s geography and 
composition.47  Following these reprisals, locals quickly learned not only to refrain from 
giving the soldiers cause to riot, but also to avoid them altogether, as was the case during 
the last army reprisal in Mallow, September of 1920. The IRA attacked a nearby military 
barracks and killed a Sergeant Gibbs in the process. The Cork Examiner detailed the 
exodus of villagers as the town was being set on fire:  
A great many of the residents, fearing reprisals, left the town during the 
day and spent the night with friends in the countryside. They were 
fortunate, for those who remained behind had a terrible ordeal. With 
blazing building all around, and with the prospect of venturing on the 
street only a little less dangerous, their position was a trying one, but they 
did not waste time in weighing the alternatives; their houses were 
threatened, and they were powerless to save them, so taking what 
belongings they could put together they sought refuge in the open fields.48 
This reaction by the villagers was markedly different from those a year before. The 
actions of the Cork residents versus those of Mallow a year later show a population that 
had learned that it was futile to oppose soldiers intent on destroying their property. The 
lesson learned by the army was not that such reprisals would discourage the IRA from 
attacking a barracks or murdering soldiers out on the town with Irish women. Instead, the 
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army discovered that localized, unsanctioned violence could intimidate most of the Irish 
into a defenseless state, even if the latter previously experienced the soldiers’ wrath only 
by proxy.    
The end of unofficial army reprisals came from a desire to restore the military’s 
discipline among the lower ranks (despite sympathy from the officers and senior 
leadership), not from the notion that further reprisals would cause the population to 
facilitate attacks by the IRA or support Sinn Fein more readily. Unofficial reprisals by the 
Army were typically conducted and led by enlisted men. IRA sympathizers and 
volunteers insisted to the local papers that officers led these reprisals, although the 
evidence for this in the Irish Independent seems to be village gossip, insofar as these 
assertions were “publicly stated all over the town that some of the officers took part with 
the men in the shop-wrecking outrage—officers in mufti.”49  British army accounts 
naturally differ. Only one memoir implicates a British officer named Godfrey leading 
soldiers in the Fermoy reprisals while carrying an entrenching tool handle.50  Usually, a 
combination of army officers and the RIC ended the reprisals and ushered the soldiers 
back to their barracks. General Macready saw the need to end the reprisals altogether, 
although his motive was not adherence to minimum force. In a private letter to Henry 
Wilson, who shared Macready’s disdain for Sinn Fein and the IRA, Macready said, “no-
one with the interests of the Army at heart can for a moment approve of [unofficial] 
reprisal.”51  Wilson and Macready began punishing the leading participants in the 
reprisals while other officers, such as General Strickland of the Sixth Division, increased 
the operations tempo to keep the men occupied and therefore decrease the risk of 
reprisals stemming from frustration caused by the IRA’s ostensible legal 
invulnerability.52 The army also created summary courts martial and even sanctioned the 
execution of IRA operatives captured with weapons to eliminate the need of reprisals and 
re-impose discipline. 
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From 1919, the RIC was reinforced by an influx of former (primarily English 
enlisted) soldiers who, because their uniforms were a composite of army khaki and RIC 
black, were called the “Black and Tans.”  The counterinsurgency was further reinforced 
by former British officers grouped into the Auxiliary Division (ADRIC) which was a 
mobile force to rush to the aid of static RIC detachments. ADRIC and the RIC would 
employ the most coercive force during the Troubles in the form of house burnings, 
beatings, and extrajudicial killings. Mockaitis blames the excesses of ADRIC and the 
Black and Tans on the fact that their membership was comprised of former soldiers who 
were “unused to police discipline” and, “in addition to violating the principle of 
minimum force, they lacked the confidence of the Irish people and so had great difficulty 
in developing intelligence contacts.”53  D.M. Lesson, in The Black and Tans, argues on 
the contrary that it was “police discipline” that was the problem. He points out that while 
Irish nationalist folklore attributes atrocities to the former English soldiers and veterans 
of the Great War incorporated into the RIC, in fact they were mainly bystanders as Irish 
veterans of the RIC with extensive local knowledge targeted supporters of Sinn Fein and 
the IRA for reprisals.54  The assumption that the Black and Tans were an organization 
separate from the RIC rather than merely English reinforcements integrated into RIC 
ranks allowed nationalists subsequently to present the Troubles as a popular Irish 
rebellion against English colonialism, rather than as an Irish civil war.   
The most destructive counterinsurgency organization proved to be the Auxiliaries, 
the forerunners of the Special Night Squads, “ferret forces” and other special operations 
innovations that were institutionalized in British counterinsurgency approaches. Major 
General Henry Tudor, a veteran of the Boer War, thought it best to militarize the RIC’s 
auxiliaries for use as raiders, as well as institute several reforms that will prove eerily 
similar to methods used later in Malaya and elsewhere:  
The government . . . should replace the civil courts with military tribunals; 
introduce identity cards and passports; restrict changes of residence; 
deport Irish prisoners to Britain; and levy fines and other collective 
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punishments on disturbed districts . . . . “The whole country was 
intimidated,” he said, “and would thank God for stern measures.”55 
The RIC and Auxiliary Division took cues from the reprisals by soldiers in the 
early stages of the war by targeting the property of IRA volunteers, members of Sinn 
Fein, and their supporters. Burning houses and commercial property became a common 
occurrence. In a study of house-burning by the IRA as well as crown forces, James 
Donnelly Jr. suggests police sometimes welcomed violence from the IRA to use as an 
excuse for reprisals attacks involving arson, throughout the counties but mainly in Cork. 
However, the frequency with which the RIC employed coercive and punitive methods 
intimates that they and ADRIC needed little to no provocation for employing such 
tactics.56  D.M. Leeson notes that historians often characterize police and auxiliary 
reprisals as “blind, idiotic, indiscriminate; however, the targeting of certain commercial 
buildings—especially creameries—shows an understanding of how best to hurt the 
population and, in the hopes of police, condition the people into a state of submission.57  
Given the importance of the dairy industry in much of Ireland, bombing creameries 
functioned as a collective punishment, with as many as 800 small farms contributing to a 
creamery, as was the case in Achonry of Sligo County.58  Attacks against these interests 
injured entire counties and forced the inhabitants to refocus their efforts on sustaining 
themselves and their families. Otherwise, reprisals were fairly typical in their execution, 
with the Sack of Balbriggan earning the honor of most publicized, and, perhaps as a 
result, a contributing factor to Mockaitis’ argument that Amritsar and instances of 
brutality during the Anglo-Irish war altered the levels of violence deemed acceptable by 
the British people, leading to an insistence that crown forces maintain a perpetual 
adherence to minimum force.59  On 20 September 1920, the RIC attempted to destroy the 
town of Balbriggan, where a RIC constable had been assassinated—the RIC attacked, 
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“killing two men, looting and burning four public houses, destroying a hosiery factory, 
and damaging or destroying 49 private houses.”60  One of the most violent counties, 
Galway, became relatively pacific following a large reprisal attack in which police began 
hunting IRA volunteers, firing wildly in the streets, setting fire to houses then shooting 
locals attempting to put the fires out.61  In addition to these horrors, the police also 
destroyed the printing capacity of the local paper, announced a curfew, and destroyed the 
businesses that were boycotting crown forces in the area.62  This brutality worked on the 
tactical level. Clearly, the lessons from 1919–1921 for the counterinsurgents was not 
minimum force, but rather that indiscriminate violence against the population was 
effective and ought to be replicated. 
The Army and the RIC both believed that coercion and large-scale operations 
were conducive to victory. In British Rule and Rebellion, H.J. Simson provides an 
example of the military and civil authorities failing to communicate and coordinate after 
receiving advanced warning of an ambush, which produced several casualties among the 
security forces, as well as the kidnapping of a local magistrate near Dunbog. In the 
conclusion meant to show the importance of civil-military cooperation, Simson notes that 
collective punishment was the immediate reaction by crown forces, and, because it was 
successful, implicitly advocates such responses to insurgents’ actions: 
That evening, the question of punishment was considered.   There was no 
hope for any of the wounded police, and the resident magistrate was 
probably dead already. Nine good men were dead or dying. The 
punishment was prompt and severe. Dwellings close by the scene of the 
ambush, the inhabitants of which had fled, instead of bringing warning, 
had been burnt already by order of the officer on the spot. Rebel halls and 
meeting-places in the neighbouring market towns were burnt that night. A 
search was made for seven out of twenty-one rebel leaders on the 
intelligence list, and their houses, from which they had fled, were burnt . . 
. . Next day an order was issued and posted, giving the inhabitants forty-
eight hours in which to produce the body of the magistrate, dead or alive, 
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failing which there would be punishment twice as heavy. They produced 
the body dead within the time limit.63 
As a staff college book, the lesson of this passage is clear to officers learning how to 
prosecute “sub-war.”  The insurgents had acted outside of the realm of offenses requiring 
a minimum force response. By its actions, the IRA was no longer entitled to the same 
relatively benign treatment afforded to unarmed rioters. The IRA was responsible for an 
ambush, and the civilian population was complicit, so it too had to pay the price for 
murdering crown forces. Simson also intimates that such methods of response are 
conducive to gaining the reluctant hearts and minds of the same population that stood idly 
by as policemen were ambushed and killed, in addition to the kidnapped magistrate:   
. . . and in the end the civil power neither approved nor disapproved. 
However, positive action did help the neutrals to rally to the stronger side, 
and there was peace for many weeks. Bands trying to arrange ambushes 
were chased away by farmers, afraid that they might lose all they had if 
any ambush took place near their homes. Things went reasonably well till 
the civil power intervened again and published a decree allowing 
inhabitants to claim for their injuries inflicted on them by the police or 
military maliciously, that is, illegally by the standards of normal times . . . 
. Ambushes became fashionable again, because nobody who could get a 
nice new farm for a rotten old one took any further interest in his common 
law duty to give warning of intended murder.”64 
Again, the only lesson an officer in the British army or police can take away is that the 
state must show resolve through force. This resolve will in turn engender compliance 
among the “neutrals” and show them that the government is the stronger side and 
therefore the inevitable victor—were it not for meddlesome government agents. Outright 
brutality would also teach a similar lesson. The lesson is anathema to minimum force as 
popularly understood today, but not within the context of “aide to the civil power” among 
officers. This is the beginning of the divergence in the practice and understanding of 
minimum force as the central component of hearts and minds. 
 The perception of success with the failed “special military areas” perpetuated 
their use during and decades after the Anglo-Irish War. These areas were punitive in 
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nature, disrupting or completely shutting down trade, with curfews and restrictions on 
movement outside of the areas—similar to those “special areas” employed by the British 
in Malaya decades later, and the designation of “criminal tribes” upon which restrictions 
were heaped in India. Concerns about alienating the locals caused some special military 
areas to be abandoned. However, many officers in both the army and the RIC believed 
they were useful in separating the insurgents from the population and ensuring the latter’s 
compliance with the government’s goals. They also gave the officials legal cover for 
extremely coercive methods. The RIC Inspector General in 1918 claimed, “the punitive 
action by the Commander in Chief in placing certain disturbed areas under military 
control, and the generally increased rigour in dealing with the seditious movement have 
had a satisfactory and deterrent effect.” Sir John French echoed that sentiment: “the 
unruly elements have been brought to realize that the Government are determined that 
law-abiding citizens shall not be interfered with.”65  The officer responsible for Cork 
County, one of the more violent during the Troubles, similarly believed the restrictions 
led to the insurgents and neutrals alike “behaving themselves because the disloyal 
element are fully aware that if they don’t, further restrictions will be imposed which will 
mean pecuniary loss, and touching their pockets is the most effect form of punishment for 
the many lawless acts committed in this West Riding.”66  The rationale behind these 
thoughts had two primary facets: collective punishments were within the parameters of 
minimum force because no shots had to be fired to gain compliance, and the punishments 
were not intentionally humiliating or offensive to religious sensibilities. Those living in 
special military areas of course petitioned the government to remove the restrictions on 
the grounds that violence had indeed decreased, and the people were suffering 
financially.67   
This message was driven home in the signature British military manual of the 
inter-war years. Sir Charles Gwynn is generally credited with institutionalizing minimum 
force and defining its use for the generation of officers, in a practical if not in a legal 
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sense. Gwynn’s Imperial Policing which became a staff college staple soon after its 
publication in 1934, provided a narrative of several uprisings to explain their success or 
failure based on Gwynn’s four principles (civil military cooperation, minimum force, 
firm and timely action, civil authorities establish policy) —especially minimum force—
of countering subversion and revolt.68  The application of minimum force, according to 
Sir Charles, was limited to imperial policing—that is, political protest movements, which 
became more common in the inter-war years as nationalism took hold among Britain’s 
imperial subjects.  “Small wars,” a term made current by Major General C.E. Callwell as 
the title of his classic 1896 manual of how to fight resistance to imperial expansion and 
rule, constituted a different category, in Gwynn’s view. In small wars like those of 
colonial conquest prior to World War I, Gwynn believed, no limits on the use of force 
existed.69  In aid to the civil power, in which the government has not lost total control, 
but would were it not for the army and police, he explains that crown forces “must be 
guided in most cases by certain general principles rather than by definite orders, and, as a 
rule, they must have to decide what is the minimum force they must employ rather than 
how they can develop the maximum power at their disposal.”70  Post-hoc impositions of 
differing perceptions regarding what constitutes minimum force should be irrelevant; 
soldiers should be allowed to exercise their judgment without fear of punishment like that 
which happened to Dyer. The officer or non-commissioned officer at the scene had the 
sole responsibility for interpreting the situation and determining the appropriate use of 
lethal force if civil authorities could not provide immediate supervision. The principles to 
guide these officers are dictated by experience, and Gwynn warns that this tradition of 
“broadcasting experience” has two divergent paths: following the examples of close 
cooperation with civil authorities and the use of minimum force will lead to success, 
while the “traditions of the Indian Mutiny” of 1857 for example in which massacres of 
the indigenous population by British troops were widespread, would lead to excesses that 
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may damn officers legally and ethically.71  Gwynn argued that tradition and earlier 
experiences passed down were important guides to imperial policing, a version of 
organizational learning equal, if not more important guides to the behavior of British 
counterinsurgents, which became obvious during the Troubles (1919–21) war and the 
inter-war insurgencies in Palestine. But while Gwynn made the distinction between small 
wars and imperial policing, many British soldiers saw it as a hair splitting exercise. For 
them, political protest was simply a form of rebellion that escalated to open revolt. 
D. MINIMUM FORCE LESSONS FROM THE INTERWAR GENERATION 
TO THE NEXT 
The seeds for the modern understanding of an absolute minimum force were 
planted in Imperial Policing, but Gwynn’s explanation of the concept is confusing, 
incomplete, and ultimately denies civilian control of the military and the whole notion of 
“military aid to the civil power,” allegedly a cornerstone principle of British 
counterinsurgency. Contrary to Thornton’s arguments about the origins of minimum 
force, Gwynn states that his goal is the creation of a new tradition of minimum force, as 
the military literature of the time focused on “how an army can develop the maximum of 
power with the resources at its disposal under varying circumstances.”72 Prior to Imperial 
Policing, Callwell’s Small Wars dominated the thinking about conflicts that failed to 
achieve the level of conventional conflict between two relatively equal powers, and it 
called for the destruction of enemy property and other sources of support—including that 
of the population—to force surrender, as the Boer War illustrated. Defining minimum 
force, Gwynn states: 
Another equally important principle is that the amount of military force 
employed must be the minimum the situation demands. It should always 
be borne in mind that the hostile forces are fellow citizens of the Empire, 
and that the military object is to re-establish control of the civil power and 
secure its acceptance without an aftermath of bitterness. When armed 
hostile bodies are encountered troops can without hesitation use every 
method and weapon necessary for their defeat or capture, but drastic 
punitive measures to induce surrender, or in the nature of reprisals, may 
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awaken sympathy with the revolutionaries, and in the long run militate 
against the re-establishment of normal conditions, although at the moment 
they may prove effective.73   
Gwynn explains that minimum force is relative to the circumstances—not the 
vague imposition of an absolute minimum degree of force that the press, some 
government officials, and several historians will later insist upon. For example, Gwynn’s 
assertion that counterinsurgents may without hesitation use every method and weapons 
necessary for the insurgents’ defeat or capture when fired upon had been discarded, at 
least in theory, in the post–World War II era. In his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 
and Practice, French Lieutenant Colonel David Galula writes: 
A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with 
every available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; the 
reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is 
to apply the minimum of fire.  “No politics” is an ingrained reaction for 
the conventional soldier, whose job is solely to defeat the enemy; yet in 
counterinsurgency warfare, the soldier’s job is to help with the support of 
the population and in doing so, he has to engage in practical politics.74   
As it will be shown later, subsequent writers and practitioners impose this absolute 
minimum degree of force in the application of certain weapon systems based on their 
destructive power. For instance, on the heels of Amritsar, the British government was 
loath to allow the use of airplanes in an offensive capacity during the final phase of the 
Anglo-Irish War, although they used air power extensively in Afghanistan and 
Mesopotamia in 1919–1920. However, the positive role of air power in both Iraq and 
Ireland proved that the use of a weapon with the capacity for mass destruction need not 
be precluded.75   Likewise, Gwynn saw little need to ban weapon systems based on the 
fact that they could cause significant casualties—in  fact, he promotes their use:  
Increased fire power of rifles and automatic weapons [machine guns] 
enables columns to be kept smaller and less encumbered with transport. 
Defensive detachments of all sorts can be reduced in size, releasing more 
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men for offensive duties and simplifying the supply question . . . . The Air 
Service, even when the nature of the ground and of the enemy reduce its 
potentialities for offensive action or for reconnaissance, removes some of 
the danger which arises where ground communication with detached posts 
are interrupted.76    
The revolutionary technology of World War I was fair to use and conducive to success in 
counterinsurgency. The only limitation on tracked vehicles such as tanks or armored 
fighting vehicles Gwynn saw were imposed by the terrain and the need to maintain the 
element of surprise during offensive action. Similarly, he states that “prejudice exists 
against the employment of machine guns in dealing with internal disturbances . . . due to 
the fact that they have on occasion been ruthlessly used and on account of their potential 
destructive effects.”77  Nevertheless, their use in imperial policing is preferable as long as 
minimum force is not violated in actions like those of General Dyer, who succeeded in 
causing the unarmed crowd to try to disperse but continued to fire anyway.78  This is not 
to say that unarmed rioters were not viable targets in imperial policing. In discussing the 
1931 revolt in Cyprus, Gwynn concludes his analysis of that uprising, during which 
police fired upon civilians, by saying, “as the people made no use of firearms it was a 
comparatively easy matter for the troops to maintain the principle of minimum force, 
though it is worth noting how immediately effective was the result of the very few rounds 
that were fired to disperse dangerous rioters.”79  On September 24, 1929, the Cairo 
Brigade sent one battalion of infantry to Palestine to quell disorder there. Upon arrival, 
the troops used a “few bursts of Lewis [machine] gun fire” to deter looters, causing 
several casualties. However, Gwynn notes that “the troops had to use their weapons 
freely when intervening, yet the principle of using the minimum amount of force 
necessary was adhered to, and stringent orders for strict control of fire were in force.”80  
In effect, minimum force was originally understood to be a relative minimum degree of 
force, which could be observed regardless of the destructive capability of the weapon 
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system or whether the targets were armed. While the civil authority was responsible for 
providing guidance regarding the use of force, the senior soldier or policeman determined 
what constituted minimum force for each event, and this interpretation could vary from 
officer to officer, or within the same officer at different times of day. Minimum force did 
not apply to armed insurgents, however, who were not subject to the standards of 
conventional warfare at the time and therefore fell outside of the laws of war.   
British Lieutenant colonel H.J. Simson voiced the same admonition in his 1937 
book British Rule and Rebellion, stating the principles of rebellion vis-à-vis minimum 
force, cooperation with the civil authority, and the rest “were framed to deal with riot and 
not with sub-war,” which is armed insurrection.81  As the analysis of subsequent 
insurgencies will show, this understanding of minimum force would engender a desire to 
separate the population from the insurgents and isolate the latter so conventional force 
could be used without the consideration of noncombatants. Similarly, even though 
minimum force was part of a hearts and minds effort to gain and maintain the loyalty of 
the target population during counterinsurgency, punitive measures such as collective 
fines, curfews, movement and population controls nevertheless became part of the 
generic counterinsurgency formula. Today, proponents of absolute minimum force view 
these tools as anathema to minimum force doctrine.   
Thomas Mockaitis, whose academic restatement of Sir Robert Thompson’s view 
that the British army had established the correct minimum force calculus to make it the 
leader in counterinsurgency warfare doctrine, noted in 1990 that “English common law 
dictated that disorders had to be suppressed with minimum force. Originally confined to 
civil unrest in Britain, the principle gradually expanded to include all forms of unrest 
from riot to revolution.”82  Minimum force pertained not only to the relationship between 
crown forces and the insurgents, but also to the treatment of locals within the parameters 
of hearts and minds campaigns. Initially, however, minimum force was not a 
consideration within punitive measures by the military, police, and civil authorities—so 
long as the punishments did not humiliate citizens or insult their religious sensibilities. 
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Speaking on the need to extract information from the population and turn that 
information into intelligence, Gwynn writes,  
Outbreaks of sabotage stand on much the same footing, and, owing to the 
difficulty of fixing individual responsibility, it may frequently be 
necessary to deal with them by collective punishments. It is in these 
matters particularly that officers should be vested with special powers, but 
these must at all times be clearly defined and used with discretion . . . . 
Such measures as the detention of suspects, forcing the inhabitants to 
repair without payment damage caused by sabotage in their 
neighbourhood, or, at times, infliction of fines to pay for labor brought 
from elsewhere, are typical of reasonable measures which have often been 
justified . . . . On the other hand, superior authority seldom approves 
physical chastisement or destruction of property, except in the course of 
quelling actual resistance.83   
Crown forces were instructed on the use of coercion to ensure compliance from 
various groups within the population. In this way, hearts and minds, as part of the British 
counterinsurgency formula, was not merely the benign bribery of new schools, hospitals, 
and other public works projects that Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, and others have 
sold to the world in the face of pressure from British and international organizations, 
media, and government. Even in Malaya between 1948 and 1960, the signature success of 
British counterinsurgency, the hearts and minds campaign combined public services such 
as schools and utilities with a large dose of raw coercive force in the manner Charles 
Gwynn describes. Before an examination of the pressures which altered the popular 
understanding if not the practice of minimum force, examining the organizational culture, 
or the method of broadcasting experience, will show why the brutal methods of the army 
and the Royal Irish Constabulary and Palestinian Police Force came to dominate the 
“inside game” of British counterinsurgency throughout the wars of decolonialization.   
Because soldiers and policemen, as well as practitioners turned historian, like H.J. 
Simson, believed the truce that ended the Troubles was an unnecessary capitulation—
given the perception among crown forces that military victory was imminent toward the 
end of 1921—the harsh methods of special military areas, coercion, reprisals, and other 
collective punishments such as curfews and fines were seen as completely justified and 
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acceptable practices. Toward the war’s end, the IRA’s flying column were effectively 
countered by British flying columns, IRA ambushes were proving to be more costly than 
before, which encouraged a preference for road-side bombs. The RIC won the vast 
majority of battles involving IRA attempts to overrun barracks. In effect, the IRA was 
losing militarily, and they knew it.84  The horrors of the Boer War, Jillianwala Bagh, and 
the Irish War of Independence did not, however, significantly alter the military’s and 
colonial police’s understanding of what minimum force entailed or to whom it applied 
and when. Civil authorities and security forces would continue to disagree on this matter 
throughout the decolonialization period. The army turned to collective punishments and 
an increased degree of coercion and force. The perception that these methods worked on 
the tactical level and hence translated into strategic victory would lead to their 
widespread use later in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Aden, and elsewhere. Failure could be 
explained away as a “stab-in- the-back” by civilian authorities and soft populations at 
home. The methods of the Black and Tans with the RIC, as well as ADRIC, would later 
become a first resort for colonial police in the absence of strategic planning by civil 
authorities—as was the case during the Troubles—during the inter-war years and the 
Cold War. However, the British combatants would attempt to highlight the incentives of 
schools and clinics, coupled with low-intensity contact, as the model of 
counterinsurgency while obfuscating the coercive practices or, as Mockaitis does, portray 
such instances are exceptions rather than the norm.   
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III. PALESTINE BECOMES THE NEW IRELAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrinal pillars of British counterinsurgency as advertised are minimum 
force, “aid to the civil power” which essentially meant police primacy in operations with 
the army in support, and maintaining operations within a legal framework. Chapter II 
argued that, since its inception in the aftermath of World War I as the British army 
transitioned from small wars to colonial policing, minimum force was a fluid concept 
whose parameters were left largely to the interpretation of officers on the ground. Chapter 
IV will contend that concept of “legality” as a guide to lawful actions and an operational 
and tactical constraint on British counterinsurgency operations in the post–World War II 
era was elastic to the point of being functionally meaningless. This chapter will continue 
the examination of “aid to the civil power” as explored initially in the discussion of the 
Troubles. As witnessed in Ireland between 1919 and 1921, the police as representatives 
of the civil power were a militarized force that was too often poorly trained, ill 
disciplined, uninformed because it was largely clueless when it came to local languages 
and cultures, and unaccountable. It had no doctrine of colonial policing as such, but 
merely passed on practices and habits, many informed by racist attitudes, from Ireland 
via the Palestine Gendarmerie/Police to the British colonial dominions.  
B. PALESTINE 1929 
Since the late 19th century, the paramilitary RIC, and its successor from 1922 the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, rather than the English “Bobby” that answered to local 
authorities and exemplified community policing, became both the organizational model 
and a source of recruits and sometimes training for colonial police forces. The role of the 
RIC was to habituate Irish Catholics to respect English law with sword and rifle. This 
model translated naturally to the colonies where the police were to protect expatriates and 
their property and enforce British rule over peoples of color. “The reality of [empire] 
policing was far removed from the image of the bobby on the beat,” concludes British 
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historian of the police, Georgina Sinclair.85  The road to colonial policing in terms of 
doctrine and experience ran from Ireland through Palestine, which became a British 
mandate at the close of World War I. To relieve the army from the chore of policing this 
new imperial acquisition, Winston Churchill created a British section of the Palestine 
Gendarmerie. The disbanded RIC was an obvious source of recruits. In fact, following 
the war in Ireland, the former RIC officers were encouraged to join the newly formed 
Palestine Gendarmerie that became the Palestine Police in 1926. Georgina Sinclair, in At 
the End of the Line, writes of a large recruiting drive among the RUC that practically 
filled the Palestine Gendarmerie’s initial personnel requirements: 
Recruitment for the new unit was opened in London as well as Dublin, and 
some 700 men came forward. Brigadier General Angus MacNeill was 
placed in charge of taking the newly-formed corps to Palestine, following 
initial training at Fort Tregantle in Britain. MacNeill had been authorized 
to recruit 49 officers and 701 other ranks. His second-in-command was 
Major G. Foley, who had joined the RIC in 1911 and had been responsible 
largely for training in County Mayo. By March 22 [1922], the British 
Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie was made up almost exclusively of 
former regular and auxiliary RIC members.86 
Consequently, County Mayo, where Major Foley was stationed before becoming 
the second in command of the Palestinian Gendarmerie, saw the second highest recorded 
levels of violence by police and soldiers during the war, and it contained the second 
highest number of Black and Tans, as well as ADRIC policemen.87  Offenses by police 
included a large-scale reprisal in the spirit of Balbriggan, execution of prisoners, extra-
judicial killings (some of which were covered up by fellow police), and a policy of 
frequent small-scale reprisals encouraged by the county inspector, who believed such 
methods were the key to gaining the population’s compliance and defeating the IRA.88  
The RUC ranks recruited for service in Palestine were generally either complicit in such  
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behavior or had utilized such methods themselves, as shown previously. The British 
government essentially exported Black-and-Tannery, not minimum force doctrine, to 
Palestine.     
Imperial policing and, later, counterinsurgency in Palestine was an effort that no 
amount of force—minimum or otherwise—could influence. According to conventional 
counterinsurgency wisdom, because minimum force is always a putative part of the larger 
hearts and minds campaign—whether it consists of coercion, political concession, public 
services, or a combination thereof—the degree of force used can only alienate the 
population if there is a chance that the target audience is politically pliable, or “biddable” 
in current COIN jargon. The belligerents in Palestine—Zionist and Arab—were not 
willing to accept each other from the outset of the Mandate in 1922. This is because the 
1917 Balfour Declaration had designated Palestine as “a national home for the Jewish 
people” in fulfillment of Zionist aspirations. The local Arab population who had not been 
consulted naturally began to object when European Jews began to arrive in ever larger 
numbers to buy land and establish communal farms known as kibbutzim. The problem 
for the British is that they could not craft a political compromise acceptable to both sides. 
So, in the absence of a viable policy, they were forced to fall back on coercive tactics, 
first against one side, then against the other.  
Mockaitis characterizes the inter-war period as one during which  
. . . every soldier had the concept of minimum force drilled into him. The 
British generally did not tolerate anyone taking the law into his own 
hands. Isolated incidents of ill treatment no doubt occurred, but these were 
never the result of official policy. Allegations of misconduct were usually 
investigated and abuses stopped. The lessons of Ireland and Amritsar were 
that at any given time a soldier might be asked to account for his actions.89 
He is being naïve. Minimum force defined by Sir Charles Gwynn allowed rioters and 
small mobs to be dispersed with the least amount of lethal force required. Of course, the 
determination of “least amount” was left up to the discretion of the enforcer. The problem 
for colonial policing in the inter-war period was that colonial governments, their armies 
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and police forces made no distinction between political protest, strikes, and armed 
rebellion, as Amritsar demonstrated. On the contrary, each was seen as part of a 
continuum of escalating violence that challenged the legitimacy of colonial rule.     
A decade of smoldering Arab discontent with British policy in Palestine erupted 
into serious violence in 1929. While Colonial Office officials and Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, 
summoned to Palestine to oversee police reforms, desired a civil police force that would 
focus on crime prevention without the use of firearms, the nature and character of the 
Palestinian conflict would obviate any such transition to an English police model.90  Jews 
and Arabs fought for the use of religious sites considered holy to each in mid-August. 
The more numerous Arabs under the leadership of Haj Mohammed Effendi Amin el-
Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, began attacking the small number of Jewish 
enclaves. Arabs who ventured into Jewish neighborhoods might be murdered. While the 
violence was severe, it was inter-communal and not directed at the government. The 
duties of security forces, then, consisted of “rescue and protection work.”91  To that end, 
the reinforced police and soldiers were expected to react with minimum force, unless 
confronted by armed bands. Crown forces, however, did not comply with that 
requirement in many cases. On 26 August, as reinforcements were deploying from 
various parts of Palestine to the more troubled areas, a platoon of royal marines under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel Petre responded to rumors of Arabs threatening to loot 
the village of Khulde.92  The Arab mobs had been attacking Jews throughout the day with 
edged and blunt weapons, yet the platoon responded with ostensibly unwarranted lethal 
force, killing 25 and wounding 30 or more attackers who had surrounded a house 
containing 30 Jews seeking refuge.93  The next day, LTC Petre issued a warning based on 
intelligence stating Bedouins intended to attack Katra. After evacuating nearby populated 
areas, he warned neighboring villages that anyone seen moving through the cleared areas 
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would be “treated as hostile.”94  This was the first free-fire area established in Palestine, 
meaning security forces could fire upon anyone entering the area without warning, 
regardless of whether they were armed or not. Despite separate occasions during which 
soldiers and police fired on Arabs attempting to escape a cordon and using a Lewis 
machine gun to inflict casualties on unarmed looters, Sir Charles’ analysis of the brief 
conflict concludes with praise of the soldiers and marines for adhering to the new 
principles of aid to the civil power: 
Although on occasions the troops had to use their weapons freely when 
intervening, yet the principle of using the minimum amount of force 
necessary was adhered to, and stringent orders for strict control of fire 
were in force. In every case troops when possible acted in close co-
operations with the police, especially when raids were carried out to effect 
arrests. Troops surrounded the villages and prevented, by fire when 
necessary, wanted men from escaping, but the actual arrests were carried 
out by police.95 
According to Gwynn’s own definition of minimum force, one could argue that 
security forces did not perform in accordance with that principle—and certainly not by 
absolute minimum force advocates like Galula and Mockaitis. Because the riots did not 
degenerate into armed insurrection, the full panoply of methods used in Ireland were not 
implemented. This would begin to change with the Arab Revolt of 1936 and more so 
during the Jewish insurrection of 1946–47.  
C. PALESTINE 1936: THE ARAB REVOLT. 
The conditions that led to the 1929 uprising had not changed by 1936. Jews and 
Arabs had incompatible goals that the British government appeared unable to reconcile. 
Committed to the Balfour Declaration, Whitehall did not want to be seen as caving to 
Arab demands., which would be seen as buckling under the threat and use of force—a 
negotiation from a position of weakness that the government would not accept., In 
Military Lessons on the Rebellion in Palestine, the Palestine General Staff concluded that 
concessions to the Palestinians, “however disguised, …would of course have been in 
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effect a submission to force, and was obviously inacceptable on that account.”96  As it 
would become habit, the British required the insurgents to be defeated prior to political 
concessions. Vacillation over the implementation of martial law—advocated by the 
military and refused by civil authority because the military could produce no clear plan of 
implementation—often inhibited strategic progress, regardless of perceived political 
impossibilities vis-à-vis capitulation on immigration numbers or self-rule. H.J. Simson 
points out in British Rule and Rebellion that civil authorities in Palestine were slow to 
acknowledge failure early and insisted on a defensive posture that spread forces thinly 
across the Mandate, thereby preventing offensive operations against the insurgents.97  
Although the British problems in Palestine were political, the military wanted to use 
overwhelming force in offensive operations, as was custom in the face of armed revolt. 
Charles Townshend provides an example of a fairly standard – at least in the RAF—
military reaction regarding the security forces’ predilection for resorting to coercion to 
subdue the population and the insurgents:  Air Commodore Authur Harris genuinely 
believed that peace could be imposed by aerial bombing, insisting that, “one 250lbs or 
500lbs bomb in each village that speak out of turn within a few minutes or hours of 
having so spoken, for example; or the complete blotting out of a few selected haunts, 
pour encourager les autres.”98  Mockaitis seems to ignore these military demands for 
excessive force and instead claims that minimum force doctrine held sway during the 
Arab Revolt. In addition to the suppression of unruly mobs on the street, minimum force 
was now redefined to include exemplary force (cordon and search operations, 
checkpoints, etc.) and direct fire engagements with armed insurgents.99  Mockaitis admits 
the military and police in Palestine used cordon and search operations as a punitive 
measure, “designed to inconvenience the population to such a degree that they would be 
disinclined to aid the rebels.”100  Firing on the unarmed civilians attempting to escape the 
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cordon did occur, although not nearly as frequently as such deaths were during 1919–
1921 in Ireland, largely because “shot while trying to escape” was too often a euphemism 
for summary execution.101 Control of the civilian population was attempted through half-
measures in 1936, as no movement controls existed for troubled areas, and no arms 
reduction measures were enforced at the border.102  Weapons and enemy riflemen flowed 
freely into Palestine from Lebanon and Syria. The army and police fell back on tactics 
that had been used in Ireland. Crown forces conducted mass arrests based on census 
information rather than accurate intelligence which they did not possess, oftentimes 
detaining innocent people whose only “crime” was that they lacked a plausible excuse for 
being in town. Military courts issued the death penalty for those found guilty of arms 
possession and houses were demolished and fines levied on entire villages.103 These large 
scale operations and punishments drove the enemy to ground, after which point the 
military and police would conduct small unit operations, such as Captain Orde Wingate’s 
“Special Night Squads,” composed of an officer and approximately 30 soldiers and 
volunteers recruited from the Jewish settler community who would conduct counter-
ambushes and other small scale operations similar to the British Flying Columns created 
at the end of the Irish Troubles, or intimidation operations that more resembled the 
behavior of the Auxies.104   
The Palestinian Police were in the forefront of these minimum force reprisals. 
Matthew Hughes writes of a group of police, only months into the actual armed 
insurgency, which terrorized Jerusalem using only truncheons, despite possessing 
firearms. The group led by the Assistant Superintendent Alan Sigrist would attack Arabs 
indiscriminately, breaking bones and leaving the victims in bloody heaps on the street.105  
Sigrist and his men would destroy the facades of office buildings and beat the staff 
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members therein, but his actions caused the people in the city to clear the streets when 
they heard the sound of his vehicle approaching.106  These larger scale attacks by the 
police were reprisals resulting from enemy actions, such as the murder of a Constable 
Bird which was answered by Sigrist’s destruction of a local newspaper office and the 
subsequent horrific beating of the people inside.107  The Assistant Superintendent was not 
stopped by the civil authorities, despite protestations by the people. Hughes writes, 
“There were so many local protests about Sigrist that the leaders of the Istiqlal 
(Independence) Party met J. H. Hall, the Mandate Chief Secretary, to make a complaint 
about the goings-on but there was no response to these petitions so Jerusalemites 
‘condemned’ and ‘sentenced’ Sigrist to death . . . .”108  An assassin’s bullet ended the 
policeman’s terrorism after the civil authorities would do nothing to curtail Sigrist’s 
activities, even after direct appeals to the Chief Secretary. At no discernible point did the 
military believe that absolute minimum force was necessary or warranted while in contact 
with armed insurgents—or in dealing with the general population who were assumed to 
be hiding and supplying the guerrillas. The Military Lessons on the Rebellion in Palestine 
mentions the benefits of coercion and the futility of maintaining the status quo vis-à-vis 
public services and daily patterns of life: 
One of the ways of [suppressing the insurgent] is to deny him the means of 
conducting his national life and, though it will seldom be politic to apply 
this in full to rebellion, it must surely be illogical to use armed force to 
maintain the national life, which of course includes that of the entire rebel 
population. In fact a partial paralysis of life has certain advantages . . . . It 
will of course injure innocent people with the guilty, but it will remove 
that apathy which prevailed among so many of the population in Palestine. 
In rebellion there can be no neutrals.109 
The goal, obviously, was the cow the population rather than win it over through 
displays of minimum force. The British military and police, however, remained 
convinced that the tactics and methods from Ireland and now Palestine were the correct 
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ones likely to get results against colonial people. Any failure in Palestine from 1936 to 
1939 was, in their view, the fault of the civil authorities who failed to relinquish control 
to the military—however politically unpalatable it may have been.110  Facing an enemy 
that would not be placated short of a political settlement, the resort to compelling force 
was perceived as the only tool left to the crown forces.   
During the Arab Revolt, a divergence of the civil authority as a tempering agent 
versus the military’s desire for greater autonomy in operations and the use of force 
emerged. In 1937, H. J. Simson accused the civil authorities of executing a policy of 
“extreme moderation,” which “naturally entailed the imposition of restrictions on the 
action of both police and troops.”111  In his view—the one to which officers were 
exposed in staff college—the civil authorities often viewed the insurgents and 
counterinsurgents dispassionately: “The civil power, therefore, is not at one with its 
police and armed forces. It just regards them as one dog in a dog-fight, no better, and 
perhaps no worse, than the other dog, just a dog.”112  As a symptom of this conflict in 
civil-military relations, the police, especially, were undergoing an externally imposed 
identity crisis, of sorts. As previously mentioned, Sir Herbert Dowbiggin had been trying 
to instill the civil, metropolitan policing model on the Palestine Police Force prior to 
1936. His goal was to turn the PPF into a largely unarmed crime-prevention organization 
similar to the Metropolitan Police in England—with the exception of a reserve capacity 
to conduct security operations in tandem. After the strike in 1936 and the subsequent 
riots, however, the circumstances called for a halt and reversal in the transition to a civil 
police force in lieu of the standard RIC-based colonial model. Lord Peel, in the course of 
heading the commission on the Palestinian revolt, brought Sir Charles Tegart to Palestine 
to serve as an unofficial police advisor.113  Tegart initially agreed with Dowbiggin that 
the Palestine police should adopt the civil policing model. However, the nature and 
character of the Arab Revolt caused him to change his mind; his final report on the police 
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advocated a continued militarization of the entire police force and the creation of a 
mounted division.114  This latter recommendation would manifest in 1944 as the 
Palestine Police Mobile Force (PPMF), which served as a military-style mobile strike 
force in the style of the Auxiliaries and the Special Night Squads. In lieu of batons and 
sometimes revolvers, characteristic of civil policing, new recruits—many of whom were 
World War II veterans who were placed in senior positions against the will of the 
Colonial Office—were trained on the use of Bren guns, Lewis guns, Thompson 
submachine guns, standard rifles sited for 500 yard targets, and organized in military 
companies using army drills.115 Georgina Sinclair, in At the End of the Line, explains 
how the Palestine Police Force slowly became the reincarnation of the RIC, as a result of 
this military training:  
Thus, moves to civilianise aspects of the Palestine Police were pushed 
aside by the need for a semi-militarised police force that could operate 
effectively in a colonial war. Thus, the need for colonial-style police 
training remained paramount, and there is no better example of this than 
the Palestine police. Its influence with regard to training and paramilitary 
policing duties was carried throughout the Empire.116 
In effect, the traditions of the RIC (with Black and Tans) and ADRIC were 
perpetuated, but this time with better military training and equipment.   
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IV. THE SLIDING SCALE OF “MINIMUM FORCE” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The erosion of European empires accelerated after World War II, as indigenous 
nationalism gained momentum. In Winning Hearts and Minds, Susan Carruthers wrote 
that Britain’s hold over its possessions disintegrated “both morally and materially…In 
moral terms, ‘Empire’ increasingly appeared to be an idea whose time had expired—the 
war having left the two most vocally ‘anti-imperialist’ powers [the United States and the 
USSR] pre-eminent.”117 Apart from imperial nostalgia or the power of colonial lobbies, 
the fact that Britain needed the colonies that had provided materiel during the war to aid 
in its post-war recovery, made London reluctant to cut loose from her colonial empire 
without a struggle.118 The fear of communist expansion resumed after the Nazi 
government’s defeat provided an excellent justification for strengthening the grip of the 
homeland in the colonies, especially during and after the communist insurgency in 
Malaya, which began in 1948 as Britain gave up the fight for Palestine. Anti-communism 
became a popular trope in post-war colonialist circles—in 1950, the Colonial Secretary, 
James Griffiths argued that the Malayan Emergency was part of a greater global 
communist threat disguised as nationalism, while the Chief of Staff for Middle East Land 
Forces saw the Kikuyu insurgency in Kenya, which erupted in 1952 principally over land 
rights as “excellent material for the Communist inspired agitators who are now trying to 
work up discontent and to promote strikes.”119   
The global threat that communism allegedly posed for the empire might suggest 
that minimum force had become obsolete as a doctrine for imperial survival, an 
insufficient response to a ruthless foe directed in the eyes of many by the Kremlin. Before 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillian’s “Winds of Change” speech delivered to the 
South African Parliament in February 1960, many British colonialists conceded that 
while colonial independence was on the cards, it remained in the very distant future. One 
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of the ironies of colonial counterinsurgencies, however, was that their brutality speeded 
up the move toward independence, both in the colonies and in London. Whitehall began 
to shift its priorities from retaining the colonies to ensuring the installation of indigenous 
governments that would resist communist expansion following the withdrawal of British 
forces. In the context of the Cold War obsession with communism, it proved a delicate 
maneuver in places like Malaya, Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa, colonies that had 
large white settler populations who maintained influential contacts in Westminster and 
upon whom British army and police forces relied to maintain order. Britain’s colonial 
administrators, soldiers and policemen used to living in a nineteenth century world of 
racial hierarchy and respect were left to deal with increasingly vocal and violent 
indigenous demands for redress of political and economic inequalities, demands backed 
increasingly by international public opinion, but which they attributed to communist 
machinations, when in fact, with the exception of Malaya, this was not the case. This put 
the doctrine of minimum force under considerable stress at the very moment when the 
Geneva Conventions and the European Convention on Human Rights, in the shadow of 
the Holocaust, were attempting to codify the treatment of civilians in war zones.  
Britain’s civilian leadership insisted, at least in public, that its soldiers and police 
respect human rights while dealing with insurgents and the populations in which they 
acted. In practice, however, while counterinsurgents claimed to use minimum-force 
doctrine, in fact they ignored it when the prying eyes of national civil authorities and the 
media were absent. Proclamations of adherence to minimum force as part of a greater 
hearts and minds strategy were a façade used to placate the concerns of human-rights 
advocates. “Population-centric” counterinsurgency tactics were promoted as a way to 
deal humanely with rebellions against colonial authority. In the aftermath of the 
Holocaust and the murder of literally millions of Soviet POWs by the Nazis, the growing 
concern about the treatment of both combatants and noncombatants, regardless of 
whether armed conflicts were interstate or intrastate, was quickly manifested in 
international law previously mentioned. Naturally, as one of the Allied powers, Britain 
had to behave—or pretend to behave—according to the new morality in the conduct of  
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war. Accordingly, Colonial Secretary Sir Arthur Creech-Jones, wanted “to ensure that 
notions of Britishness were inculcated to leave an acceptable face of imperialism at 
independence.”120 
International humanitarian law during this time forbade many of the coercive 
methods popular among colonial soldiers, police, and governments. However, the British 
government developed a strategy for avoiding the constraints posed by such laws. David 
French writes in The British Way of Counterinsurgency that the strategy had three 
components. First, they tried to prolong discussions on laws proposed to curtain violence 
in warfare. Then, when that effort was exhausted, they raised legal objections in order to 
delay ratification, which meant that the 1949 Geneva Convention was only ratified in 
1957.121  The British objected specifically to Article 68 of the Convention, which forbade 
executing civilians by criminal court. They also argued that several other provisions 
would limit their ability to treat insurgents and their supporters as rebels rather than as 
noncombatants.122  The second legal dodge involved finding loopholes in the laws that 
would permit certain behaviors, even if the spirit of the law were violated. David French 
provides the example, 
When the Kenya government wanted to incarcerate over 70,000 [Kikuyu, 
Embu, and Meru] in work-camps where they could pursue a policy of 
“redemption through work,” the Colonial Office warned that they might 
be in breech of the 1930 ILO Conventions against Forced Labor and 
ECHR. But a sharp-eyed lawyer spotted two legal loop-holes. Article 2 of 
the ILO convention and Article 4 of the ECHR permitted governments to 
extract forced labor from its citizens in cases of emergency.123 
The final component of the avoidance strategy consisted of merely implementing 
the sections of law they found acceptable, and objecting to sections they found 
unacceptable. “Article 15 of the ECHR permitted derogation from the obligations 
accepted under the Convention during a public emergency, provided the government 
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concerned gave formal written notice of Derogation . . . .”124  As the conduct of the 
subsequent counterinsurgencies will show, neither the Geneva Conventions nor the 
ECHR impeded the use of force or collective punishments. However, the growing 
pressure to abide by the international laws would lead, in part, to the declarations of 
“winning hearts and minds,” especially in Malaya, as will be discussed later.   
B. PALESTINE 
As Britain’s position in Palestine deteriorated from 1946, they moved further 
away from minimum force doctrine and obtaining the popular support of the people. To 
be fair, no strategy was likely to work in a place where Zionist settlers, known as the 
Yishuv, and Arabs had incompatible political goals that would seem to brook no 
compromise. A political solution seemed out of the question, especially as a condition for 
curtailing the “Arab Revolt” of 1936–1939, the British had promised to curtail Jewish 
immigration into Palestine. The problem, of course, was that the Holocaust not only 
created great international sympathy for the surviving Jewish population. It also increased 
the demand for Holocaust survivors to immigrate to Palestine, a demand supported by 
Britain’s major ally, the United States. Therefore, the traditional divide-and-rule 
counterinsurgency strategy – to pit one group against another – was off the table because 
Britain was unable in the aftermath of the Holocaust to enlist the Arabs as allies in an 
anti-Zionist counterinsurgency. In these conditions, two small groups of Zionist terrorists 
were able to provoke the British army and police who into overacting against the Yishuv. 
This collapse of minimum force caused the Zionist population to back wholeheartedly the 
departure of Britain from Palestine. The result was a catastrophic failure of British 
counterinsurgency doctrine. 
Gwynn’s warning that the default position of the military and police toward 
violence was aggravated by the forces’ experience in Palestine. David French provides 
examples of the military’s belief in the efficacy of brutality in counterinsurgencies, just as 
they did in Ireland and the earlier revolts in Palestine. A letter by LTC J.M.H Hackett, 
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commander of an airborne regiment in Palestine in 1948, explains the perceived necessity 
of harsh treatment of the Zionist population: 
No matter what the politicians say, every soldier who served in Palestine 
during the recent trouble knows, unfortunately by bitter experience, that 
when the security forces have to deal with a thoroughly non-cooperative, 
unscrupulous, dishonest and utterly immoral civil population such as the 
Jewish Community in Palestine, who systematically and continually hide 
and refuse to give up for justice the perpetrators of murderous outrages, 
reprisals are the only effective weapon to employ, saving time, money and 
unnecessary bloodshed.125 
In keeping with the spirit of Hackett’s sentiments and the unalloyed anti-Semitism 
they reveal, the British extended a policy hitherto deployed exclusively against Arabs of 
destroying the property—houses and a citrus grove—from which units were attacked.126  
The methodology of reprisals had not evolved since the Irish Troubles (or the Boer War, 
for that matter), although the threshold of provocation had risen with the presence of the 
press. Therefore, reprisals may have been less frequent than applied elsewhere, if not less 
destructive. The Palestine Police Force retained some brutal traditions from ADRIC, just 
as the military took responsibility for meting out justice. In fact, David French depicts 
British soldiers and police in Palestine as trying their best to avoid minimum force 
constraints: 
In November 1946 members of the [Palestine Police]left nine people in 
hospital when they smashed Jewish cafes and a dairy in reprisal for the 
deaths of three of their comrades. By early 1947 parts of the army and 
police were locked into a cycle of reprisals and unofficial counter-
reprisals. In February 1947, following the sentence of death passed on one 
of their members, Dov Gruner, the Irgun attacks the HQ of 1/Parachute 
Regiment and in separate operations blew up two jeeps.  “The Airborne 
reaction to this followed five days later, when some 65 men from Tel Aviv 
were taken to Sarona camp and made to run the gauntlet while being 
beaten with sticks.”  In April two British policemen were shot in 
Jerusalem. The same night two Jewish youths claimed they had been 
arrested and beaten by plain-clothes policemen. The hanging of two 
British sergeants by the Irgun on 31 July 1947 sparked more reprisals. In 
Tel Aviv on the night of 31 July parties of soldiers, some in civilian 
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clothes, armed with sub-machine guns and batons, assaulted people, 
smashed shop windows, and stole valuables. In a separate incident three 
armoured cars appeared and fired in all directions, and in another incident 
five soldiers in the Hartikva quarter of Tel Aviv fired guns and threw a 
bomb into a cinema.127 
The list goes on. Administratively, the local civil authorities did little to deter security 
forces from fighting the counterinsurgency as they saw fit. The General Staff in 1946 
provided the rationale for coercive force in a brief to the Palestinian Secretary of State: 
“It is inevitable that in the course of such action certain law abiding Jewish citizens may 
be molested, but it may serve to bring home to them the fact that terrorism does not pay 
and that the community itself should give practical effect to their denunciation of 
terrorism.”128  The doctrine of LTC Hackett prevailed over that of minimum force, and 
the rationale for coercion in Palestine by the General Staff would be replicated in Malaya 
and Kenya by simply replacing “Jewish” with “Chinese” or “Kikuyu,” as it will be shown 
later. The difference was that neither the Chinese in Malaya nor the Kikuyu had strong 
international backing and sympathy as did the Zionists. As mentioned previously, 
however, Colonial Office efforts to minimize force against noncombatants and recreate 
the police in the image of Bobbies had failed, as the security situation demanded 
increased mobility and lethality. The Palestine Police Mobile Force [PPMF] filled the 
void. The police largely welcomed the change, because initially they felt poorly equipped 
given that they were expected to serve in a military capacity. Police memoirs from the 
1946–1948 show a perception that police were universally hated by both sides in the 
conflict, and “the primitive riot equipment” that “consisted of a metal shield the size of a 
dustbin lid” coupled with “steel helmets and truncheons” were woefully inadequate to 
repel the mobs.129  Conversely, the eight companies of the PPMF included “50 2-pounder 
guns, 100 smoke dischargers, 64 2-inch mortars, 50 3-inch Brownings and 132 light 
machine guns.”130  David Cesarani described the PPMF as “a mailed fist to use against 
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the terrorists.”131  Later, Malayan police, as well as those in Kenya and Cyprus, would 
create near-exact models of the PPMF for use in those subsequent insurgencies. Desires 
for a civil police model exercising minimum force were trumped by the realities of the 
Palestinian insurgency. Overwhelming force served when minimum force was perceived 
by the security forces as insufficient, despite protestations from civil authorities who 
understood the insurgencies only abstractly from afar. The colonial governors likewise 
resisted the imposition of a civil policing model by the Colonial Secretary, Sir Arthur 
Creech-Jones, who wanted to implement the same model that was advocated and 
subsequently abandoned by Dowbiggin in the 1930s. Georgina Sinclair explains that, in 
1948, Sir Arthur “sent a circular letter to each colonial government, discussing potential 
methods of dealing with civil disturbances. He explained that that . . . the police should 
employ only minimal force and that firearms should be resorted to only in extreme 
circumstances.”132  This suggestion ran counter to standard practice and the requirements 
of the security situation. The governors felt the use of firearms in all operations was in 
keeping with minimum force requirements, and reports of the character of colonial 
violence (primarily from his Commissioner of Police, Sir Colonel Arthur Young) caused 
Creech-Jones settle on a dual-purpose (civil and military) policing model.133  The 
Commander in Chief of the Middle East also petitioned the government to allow for the 
use of weapons with highly destructive capabilities. Given the precision of modern 
weapons, he asked if “they might be allowed to employ aerial bombs, naval gunfire, 
mortars and artillery to quell serious disturbances” outside of politically sensitive areas 
“such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth.”134  The Cabinet naturally denied the 
request, but the example shows the dichotomy between the approaches of civil 
authorities, who were concerned with the international media attention—as well as the  
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United Nations’ inquiries—in Palestine and perceptions of British counterinsurgency, and 
the military’s senior leaders who were more concerned about victory through the use of 
overwhelming force.   
Aware of the international attention, Jewish groups in Palestine lodged multiple 
complaints of military and police brutality. However, without substantiated evidence of 
these crimes—which included indiscriminate shooting in a village, committing “medieval 
torture” on detainees, and denying medical treatment of wounds to detainees—the 
allegations could merely be propaganda.135  David French caveats the potentially 
propaganda-driven allegations with the belief that “there is sufficient independent 
testimony to suggest that there was a substratum of truth underpinning some of [the 
allegations of brutality],” mostly from Christian groups like the Red Cross.136  The most 
prominent instance of security forces acting outside of the loose restraints of the law was 
the employment of undercover units later called “death squads,” “snatch squads,” “flying 
squads,” and “pseudo-gangs,”137 which became institutionalized in British 
counterinsurgency tactics. When the Colonial Office appointed Colonel William Nichol 
Gray to replace the commander of the PPMF in 1945, he decided to use small-unit tactics 
to supplement the large-scale cordon and search operations, some of which were 
collective punishments (notably following the King David Hotel bombing of 22 July, 
1946) that Mockaitis describes as fine examples of minimum force—insofar as thousands 
were detained indefinitely with only 20 casualties.138  Colonel Gray wanted to model 
these special forces in Palestine after SAS, at least tactically. In keeping with this goal, 
Sir James Bernard Fergusson (who knew Orde Wingate and his use of “Special Night 
Squads” from the Arab Revolt) was brought on to create and command the second 
generation of Special Night Squads.139  One of Fergusson’s squad leaders, Major Roy 
Farran, was famously acquitted in an October of 1947 court-martial for the kidnapping 
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and murder of 16 year-old Alex Rubowitz, apprehended while putting up anti-British 
posters.140  Much like General Dyer in Amritsar, Roy Farran became a mandatory 
political sacrifice insofar as the Palestinian government prosecuted him only after the 
New York Times and other international and local newspapers began uncovering details of 
the story.141  The Colonial Office would not have approved of the squads, as Gray was 
picked to lead the PPMF because the alternative choice, Colonel John Hackett, was 
passed over for having an “Aryan” wife, a fact which “has disadvantages vis-à-vis the 
Jews.”142  The authorities at the strategic level still believed they could win hearts and 
minds—which snatch squads undermined—while those at tactical level did not. Under 
inquiry, Fergusson “had justified establishing the squads by arguing that the best way to 
defeat terrorists was by using counter-insurgents who had themselves worked as 
terrorists.”143  These were, in effect, second-generation Special Night Squads, this time 
turned against the Zionists. The Farran case suggests that they operated outside of the 
rule of law, under a veil of secrecy, and they were given such wide latitude in operating 
because the authorities felt they needed “a free hand for use against terror when all others 
were so closely hobbled.”144  In short, they were unaccountable, as Farran’s acquittal 
demonstrated. 
This final insurgency against the British government in Palestine was a key 
moment in the organizational learning of British colonial security forces because, just as 
happened after the Irish Troubles, the veterans of Palestine either participated in or 
trained the forces that would fight the insurgents in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. In this 
way, coercion and terror would remain common practice in subsequent British 
counterinsurgency operations 
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C. MALAYA 
As the insurgency ended in Palestine in 1947, a new one began in Malaya, which 
came to be the primary example in the minimum force mythology—or as Mockaitis 
called it, a “textbook counterinsurgency campaign” in which hearts and minds was at the 
forefront.145 In contrast to the notion outlined in Imperial Policing, minimum force 
henceforth meant that the employment of force of any kind became a last resort, and the 
weapon systems used when the circumstances required it had to cause the least amount of 
destruction possible. To that end, In Defeating Communist Insurgency, Robert Thompson 
(who served under both Briggs and Templer in Malaya), writes, 
The really difficult operations are those which have to be conducted in the 
populated disputed areas. The army’s role here is to clear the main 
insurgent units out of the area over which the government is attempting to 
regain control, and to keep them out. Elimination of the units and the 
killing of insurgents is a secondary consideration at this stage. . . . If the 
selected area is sufficiently limited so that the government forces can 
saturate it, it is unlikely that the insurgents will seek a major battle. This is 
highly to be desired because the government forces do not want to have 
large firefights, employing heavy weapons and even aircraft, in the 
villages where they are attempting to regain control, as already mentioned, 
that type of action is liable to create more communists than it kills and 
makes the problem of pacification that much harder.146 
Thompson’s lesson in the use of force is reasonable on its face: overwhelming force may 
kill innocent people or their property, and such actions will engender hatred against the 
government forces. This was the conclusion of the Hunter Commission after the Amritsar 
massacre as well as the argument for minimum force in Gwynn’s Imperial Policing—
except that it extends to contact with armed insurgents operating in a populated area 
where assuring the population’s favorable attitude toward the government takes 
precedence over the immediate restoration of order or the defeat of guerrillas. During the 
imperial policing era, these priorities were reversed, as discussed previously. Thompson 
goes on to explain that while “restrictive measures” will end a subversive movement, the 
government runs the risk of being labeled as “repressive,” and the torture or murder of 
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detainees must be treated like the crimes they are, or else the government loses 
legitimacy and therefore the hearts and minds of the population.147  In addition to 
following the rule of law and the use of absolute minimum force, “material well-being 
and progress” rounds out the trifecta of a proper hearts and minds campaign.148  
Thompson assumed that the target population will be almost hopelessly backward, 
impressed by “four-engined jet airliners landing at their own airports,” the government’s 
ability to provide schools, hospitals, roads, running water, electricity, and other 
components of “modern development.”149  He believed the population will then reject 
rule by the insurgents, which would mean the inevitable loss of the government’s 
magnanimity, social welfare, and the road to modernity. Thompson’s assumption is that 
people will set aside potential political grievances—whether real or potential—by 
focusing on material needs that the government can provide as long as it retains control.   
 The actual Malayan formula renders popular support for the government 
irrelevant, however. To the end of separating the insurgents from the population, after 
which the insurgents can be “mopped up” in free-fire areas established outside the 
population centers, Thompson describes how to isolate the people and control nearly 
every facet of their daily life. Assuming the country in question has no large population 
centers, the government should enact the “imposition of various control measures on the 
movement of both people and resources, all of which are designed to isolate the guerilla 
forces from the population, to provide protection for the people themselves and to 
eliminate the insurgent underground subversive organization in the villages.”150  At this 
point, perhaps after the people have been relocated and forced to rebuild their village in a 
defensible area, the government controls the food, activity within, and movement outside 
of the village—eventually secured not by British soldiers but by a native home guard 
loyal to the counterinsurgents.151  With this degree of control, the target population’s 
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personal affinity toward the government is hardly a concern—they could not support the 
insurgents if they wanted to, as the hearts and minds are effectively isolated, and 
destruction of the guerrillas may resume in the jungles and fields—despite Thompson’s 
insistence that the “choice” to remain on the government’s side must be “free.”152  After 
being forcefully relocated to a new village, surrounded by barbed wire and armed guard 
towers, then allotted only enough food to feed one’s immediate family, freedom of choice 
to support the government has been removed.153  The notion of minimum force as part of 
a hearts and minds campaign to gain positive support, especially under the new paradigm 
of absolute minimum force in all operations, was a marginal consideration if it existed at 
all in Malaya; however, the myth-making persisted. 
In Low Intensity Operations, Frank Kitson (who served in Kenya and briefly in 
Malaya) writes, 
A further example of an issue on this sort concerns the extent to which 
force should be used, either by the police or by the army. In this case the 
politicians will rightly want to avoid the use of force as far as possible, 
and for as long as possible, because of the adverse effect it is bound to 
have on public opinion in the world at large and at home. At the same time 
there are military difficulties about using too little force and about 
delaying its application for too long, and these difficulties . . . must be 
presented to the political leadership by the military authorities after 
consultation with the other parties concerned, particularly the police.154    
Gwynn addressed the conundrum that soldiers and police were potentially 
damned by the civil authorities and the general public either for using too much force or 
not enough, depending on the outcome of a particular engagement vis-à-vis casualties, 
media attention, and the suppression of subversive elements. Kitson sides with the civil 
authorities who view the perception of the hypothetical officer’s act as the paramount 
consideration. To that end, minimum force, however loosely defined as an unwritten 
doctrinal component, provides the requisite justification for a court-martial should the 
outcome prove less than desirable. More importantly, Kitson draws a parallel between the 
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use of force and alienating the population—the “adverse effect it is bound to have on 
public opinion in the world at large and at home.”  By this logic, any use of force will 
drive away popular support from the counterinsurgents. Therefore, using an absolute 
minimum force will have the minimum adverse effect on hearts and minds. 
Minimum force was not a deciding factor in Malaya. Coercion and counter-terror 
were the default settings for British forces, especially before and during the 
implementation of the Briggs plan. As in Palestine before and Kenya afterward, a general 
belief that the native people and Chinese workers would respond only to force constituted 
the rationale—although not the primary reason—behind the use of coercion in lieu of 
minimum force and a hearts and minds campaign to garner popular support. In 1949, Sir 
Henry Gurney wrote to the Colonial Secretary, stating: 
A report from the Sitiawan illustrates the way in which the Chinese mind 
works.  “A person arrested by the government gets adequate food and is 
not beaten up, but if one offense the bandits and is arrested, starvation, 
assault and probably death may result, for which reason it is better to 
offend the government than the bandits.”  This puts in a nutshell the 
problem of how to convince somebody who thinks like this without 
descending to Japanese methods. On the other hand, in dealing with 
Oriental terrorism armed with modern weapons our traditional British 
methods will always be too little and too late.155 
If one assumes Gurney was referring to Gwynn’s explanation of minimum force in the 
context of imperial policing, then the statement about “traditional British methods” 
makes more sense than referencing the military and police’s organizational heritage from 
Ireland and the several subsequent revolts in Palestine—which constitute the true 
“traditional methods.”  The view that coercion and terrorism was the avenue to success in 
suppressing the insurgency was not confined to the colonial government and military 
leadership, as is usually the case. In 1950, the Colonial Secretary believed, “The 
dominant motive among the Chinese population, particularly the unprotected ‘squatters’ 
in the rural areas, is fear. The terrorist threat is certainly nearer and greater in some places 
than that of the Government and the Chinese mentality naturally tends to ensure more 
heavily against the Communists than ourselves. It is also true that the Asiatic mind 
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understands force.”156  Given this prevailing ideology, Templer’s half-hearted 
population-centric approach truly is the outlier in British counterinsurgency from 1919 to 
1970. In the meantime between Gurney and Templer, the Briggs Plan of separating the 
insurgents from the population, then instituting controls on the population’s movement 
and food, had largely negated the assertion, despite later declarations from Templer, that 
a hearts and minds campaign to gain popular support was responsible for success. David 
French writes, “Within days of his arrival in Malaya, Templer told a group of senior civil 
servants . . . ‘I could win this war in three months if I could get two thirds of the people 
on my side.’  It is not a military problem, he said. It is a political war.”157  Therefore, in 
1953, as insurgent activity was quickly declining, Templer directed his Director of 
Operations (DOO) to focus on the “political, economic, social and cultural development” 
of the Chinese immigrants who were mostly confined to their new villages under watch 
from British and home guard forces.158  The sense that Templer was Malaya’s savior 
through this hearts and minds strategy was compounded by the contrast in the frequency 
of attacks under Briggs as a violent reaction to the insurgents’ separation from the public, 
coupled with the assassination of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in October 
1951.159  If security forces casualty rates and the numbers of overall attacks serve as a 
viable metric for the efficacy of a counterinsurgency campaign, Karl Hack’s analysis of 
those figures shows a steep increase and decline under Briggs, before General Templer 
arrives on the island in 1952.160  The violent reaction from the communists to the Briggs 
Plan coupled with a high-profile assassination gave the perception that the 
counterinsurgents were losing. Frank Kitson, however, describes the methodology of the 
Briggs Plan and its effect on the communists in glowing terms: 
General Briggs no only set up the machinery for conducting the campaign, 
he also produced the plan on which it was to be based. This plan called for 
action designed to provide a measure of security for the population 
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followed by a break-up of the Communist organization outside the jungle 
by arrest and internment. The terrorists themselves were to be dealt with 
by interfering with their food supplies and by forcing them to expose 
themselves to action by the Security Forces. The most spectacular part of 
the plan consisted of an ambitious project of resettling the 400,000 
squatters into new villages protected by a Home Guard specially raised for 
the purpose which reached a strength of 200,000 within four years.161 
Kitson then notes how the Malayan Communist Party and its armed wing became “very 
worried” as a result.162  Karl Hack explains why this was so: 
Notwithstanding a genuine sense of crisis among British officials, the 
insurgents were forced to blink first. In 1951 the ratio of insurgents killed 
for every security force personnel began an inexorable rise. By the year’s 
end the vast majority of physical population movement had been achieved, 
so improvements to condition, and the development of operations around 
resettlements, could now develop. Security forces were also released for 
new tasks [in lieu of static defense], and retraining of police became 
possible from 1952. Forced onto the back foot, the communists issued 60 
pages of “October 1951 Directives,” which implied a 25% reduction in 
their frontline armed forces (to transfer people to planting, and close 
protection of the Min Yuen), and ordered a severe drop in a wide range of 
actions (especially sabotage).163  
Of course, after this transition occurred, Templer arrived and began speaking about the 
hearts and minds of the people being the key to a victory that was already achieved. The 
post-hoc ergo propter hoc conclusion had to be that the arrival of Templer, and his 
supposedly soft approach to counterinsurgency, was the true path to victory. His DOO 
subsequently claimed “the shooting war in Malaya was only 25 per cent of the struggle 
against the communists. Progress had been most pronounced in the other 75 per cent—
the struggle for the ‘hearts and minds of the people.’”164  The concomitant reduction in 
the number of hostile actions by the communists seemed to back up this claim, and so the 
minimum force myth prevailed among those looking at a successful counterinsurgency 
for lessons to apply to the next one.   
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Thomas Mockaitis states the initial reliance upon large-scale operations showed 
that the British were “slow to learn the lessons of the past,” but a victory through small-
unit operations coupled with the Briggs plan was only possible after the conventional 
“drives” through the jungles dispersed the communist formations into smaller units.165  
Mockaitis give the British forces a pass on the implementation of minimum force during 
this time of conventional tactics, a period which included the Batang Kali Massacre.166  
In December of 1948, members of the Scots Guards (and a few policemen) murdered 24 
Chinese detainees under suspicion of supporting the communists. The government 
covered up the incident by relying on the time-honored “shot while attempting to escape” 
excuse that had been used at least since Ireland.167  The soldiers were exonerated because 
the army’s Special Investigation Branch was told to ignore the evidence provided for the 
case, and the Attorney General stated privately that, “there was something to be said for 
public executions as a legitimate means to demoralize those involved in the 
insurgency.”168  David French also noted that the subsequent amendment to the 
emergency regulations—namely 27A issued at the beginning of 1949—stated soldiers 
and police were justified in shooting prisoners who are trying to escape. The regulation 
was applied retroactively, thereby ensuring the Scots Guards could not be punished.169  
Subsequent amendments obviated some problems of detainee abuse by allowing for mass 
deportations of suspects to China which had begun in 1948 without the chance for appeal. 
British authorities believed a few actions of this kind would ensure compliance among 
remaining Chinese squatters in any given area.170  Acting within the rule of law—one of 
Thompson’s five principles of counterinsurgency—is not difficult when it legality 
becomes such an elastic concept.171  The colonial police in Malaya were a large part of 
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why, as Mockaitis claimed, the British were slow to learn the minimum force and small 
unit lessons of the past. Nichol Gray, discussed in the last insurgency in Palestine, arrived 
in Malaya with 500 additional Palestinian police to bolster the ranks in 1948, bringing 
their “much needed counter-insurgency experiences.”  Like the exported RUC officers to 
Palestine in the 1920s, much of this experience was anathema to minimum force and 
hearts and minds campaigns.172  As was Gray’s custom, he created special police forces 
for combatting the communists in the latter’s area of operations (with 200 operating in 
the jungles by 1950), and he trained his police on the PPF’s tactics for cordon and search 
operations, population controls, and—with additional experts from the Colonial Office—
expertise on the enforcement of collective punishments such as curfews, shop closures, 
movement restrictions, and intercepting village collaborators.173   
The nature of collective punishments in Malaya was not significantly different 
from Ireland, and Templer did not halt the practice. In fact, Templer ordered the 
destruction of Permatang Tinggi in August of 1952 not for what the inhabitants did, but 
what they failed to do in terms of providing information on the murder of a local 
official—they were not relocated into a new village.174  Four months earlier, Templer 
punished the village of Tanjong Malim after 12 officials were murdered and the villagers 
failed to provide information—he closed down the schools, decreased the size of food 
rations, and imposed a 22-hour curfew.175  The villagers were justifiably frightened 
because British forces had detained all of the inhabitants of a village named Tras 
following High Commissioner Gurney’s assassination in 1951—the punishments served 
as effective warnings to neighboring population centers.176  Collective punishments were 
more common in 1948 and 1949, before the majority of forced relocations took place—
the house-burnings were conducted in the pursuit of intelligence, sometimes with the 
approval of the local civil-military committees established under the Briggs Plan and later 
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refined under Templer. The decrease in the number of villages destroyed coincided with a 
1950 regulation which allowed local magistrates to impose fines, order businesses to 
close, or billet security forces with the village’s inhabitants.177  By 1951, the insurgency 
was faltering, and the use of coercion had not changed, even if the rhetoric did with 
Templer’s arrival and oversight of the final stage of the counter-insurgency.   
D. KENYA 
As Templer was “winning” hearts and minds through coercion and public works, 
the Mau Mau insurgency was beginning in 1952. No other British counterinsurgency 
effort was more antithetical to the exercise of minimum force, the goal of which has 
always been preventing the alienation of non-combatants who might not otherwise side 
with the insurgents’ cause. Mockaitis, although conceding brutal methods were used, 
describes the horrors of the Kenyan campaign as strategically “confused.”178  Hearts and 
minds during this war was nearly as irrelevant as they were in the Jewish insurrection in 
Palestine. The insurgency was comprised of members of the Kikuyu tribe, for whom the 
primary grievance rested on 14, 000 square miles of land, and the presence of Europeans 
on it.179  Isolating the insurgents (outside of Nairobi) from the remaining Kenyan 
population was, therefore, relatively easy, for both geographical and tribal reasons. 
Mockaitis, Sinclair, and others blamed the “outright brutality” of the counterinsurgency 
partially on racial animosity—the attitude of Europeans toward the Africans.180  To be 
sure, many counterinsurgents harbored racist beliefs. Sinclair recounts an interview with 
a colonial policeman who served in Kenya: “White people were of importance simply by 
being white. It was an inescapable fact of colonial life.”181  From this statement and 
several others like it, she claims, “this [racist] belief shaped the attitude of the colonial 
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authorities towards the colonized and thus, of the policeman towards the citizen.”182  The 
Colonial Secretary believed the Kikuyu were not a “warlike tribe,” so it would be easy to 
intimidate them: 
Their history was that they cultivated land near the fringes of the bamboo 
forests, and, when the warlike Masai appeared, they fled to the forest. 
They are the most advanced tribe and give the best work, and, since, they 
have not lived by the spear, they have had to live by their brains. From 
having their ears to the ground to listen for the approach of the Masai, they 
have learned to have their ears to the ground to listen for any political 
tremors and turn them to their advantage. They are sometimes said to be 
like the Irish in politics, without their humour, and like the Jews in 
commerce, without Leviticus. They are disliked and despised by nearly all 
the other tribes, particularly the Luo and the Masai.183 
However, in the current culture of political correctness, some historians may be lending 
too much explanatory power to racist interpretations of tribal character. One must recall 
that the methods used in Malaya and Kenya were inherited from Palestine, which in term 
trace their origins to the Irish Troubles. And while the Irish may have been viewed as 
inferior to the English, the fact that the Irish (or the Boers, for that matter) were white 
Europeans did not prevent or deter atrocities committed by Irish constables on their own 
people. But it did determine the tolerance of the British population to countenance such 
brutality, once they became aware of it. So, for instance, French was forbidden to 
institute concentration camps in Ireland, or attack the IRA from the air. Without a doubt, 
racism determined the character of many counterinsurgency methods, which was reason 
the British had simply to give up their campaign against Zionists in Palestine.   There was 
simply not the same degree of popular interest or sympathy in a Britain struggling to 
recover from the effects of the war for indigenous populations of color in distant corners 
of the empire in rebellion against the crown in the immediate post–World War II era. 
Previous insurgencies have shown that the military and police were more willing to 
dispense with (relative or absolute) minimum force than the colonial government, the 
colonial governments were more willing to forsake minimum force than the Colonial 
Office, and the Colonial Office was generally more permissive than the Cabinet, which 
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denied most significant requests authorizing more coercion or more destructive weapon 
systems, primarily aircraft used in an offensive capacity. Without the added pressure of 
the media on the Home and Colonial Offices, the liberal use of force generally proceeded 
unchecked in Africa. Coercion thrived out of public view and hence legal accountability.
 The Kenyan security forces—particularly the colonial police—were understrength 
at the beginning of the emergency, yet they still conformed to the policing standards 
maintained through the last Palestinian insurgency and before. The paramilitary trends in 
Africa were increasing, and the use of force remained consistent with the degree of 
militarization. The Colonial Office, as discussed above, had been trying to impose a civil, 
or metropolitan, policing style on the colonial police—insisting on general disarmament 
and a return to crime prevention. However, “the need for containment of public disorder 
and civil disobedience . . . [and] a serious shortage of manpower” frustrated these 
attempts.184  In Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Kenya, and elsewhere in Africa, police were giving 
up on the use of non-lethal or less-than-lethal weapons in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
opting for lethal force at the outset of a disturbance, as opposed to an escalation of force 
as the disturbance progressed: “In the more serious situation, baton and gas use would be 
relinquished in the front line to armed policemen, each of whom would load a single 
round, and, if the crowd still failed to disperse, would raise their rifles . . . . This would be 
followed by a volley . . . repeated as necessary, based on the so-called principles of 
minimum force.”185  When abuses in the early stages of the Kenyan insurgency occurred, 
Mockaitis says, “These atrocities were perpetrated by individuals not subject to 
traditional army or police discipline.”186  This claim was true to a point, in that settler-led 
militias in Kenya as in Malaya inflicted great violence on the population. However, 
atrocities were not confined to these groups. Members of the Kenya Police would stand 
by idly as their native subordinates delivered “electric shocks to the testicles of suspects” 
or displaying mutilated bodies or decapitated heads on posts as a warning to other 
insurgents—the thinking was that the native forces under British command and control 
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were perhaps exempt from the ideals of politically liberal warfare because they had 
“witnessed the horrors perpetrated by Mau Mau” and were justified for having “different 
standards of behavior.”187  The British officers in charge of native security forces were 
subject to traditional army and police discipline, so the exemption for these forces 
discarding minimum force provided by Mockaitis should not apply. Occasionally, 
however, underequipped native police without a British commander would resort to the 
use of “home-made Dane guns, poisoned arrows, spears and machetes,” using the 
maximum lethal force at their disposal during relatively minor rioting.188  Similarly, the 
Europeans in the Kenyan Police Reserve or the natives in the Kikuyu Home Guard 
committed atrocities against the Mau Mau and those believed to support them, but those 
acts did not account for the bulk of the coercion in Kenya.189  Coercive practices were 
part of the institutional heritage for the regular military and British (white) colonial 
police. W.C. Johnson, Police Advisor the the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
submitted the “Report on the Colonial Police Service” on December 28, 1948, noting that 
colonial police in Africa “will act as a soldier although wearing a police uniform,” so the 
civil policing model continued to diminish in the face of a greater desire for force to 
confront and contain the upheaval in the African colonies and protectorates.190  Georgina 
Sinclair states the militarization of the police and concomitant use of force beyond the 
expectations of minimum force “increased in the post-war period with the general 
colonial upheaval and [was] noticeably bolstered by an intake of recruits who had served 
in the armed forces and the Palestinian Police.”191  With the influx of former Palestinian 
forces came allegations of beatings and torture of detainees, and an increase in the 
number of detainees “shot while trying to escape,” “failing to halt” which had long been a 
euphemism for extra-judicial killings by crown forces, although it remains difficult to 
establish how many of the deaths were the result of genuine escape attempts.192  The 
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common knowledge off this euphemism implies an understanding by security forces that 
minimum force should be employed, and a subsequent decision to abandon it. This 
behavior had been the unwritten standard since the Troubles, although forces in Kenya 
ostensibly increased the practice to unprecedented levels, as Governor Baring reported in 
1953 that 430 Kenyans were shot either trying to evade capture or attempting to escape 
after being captured—the police were assisted in this tally by the King’s African Rifles, 
commanded by ethnically British officers, and the white settlers comprising the Kenyan 
Police Reserve (KPR).193  A Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya reported to the Colonial 
Secretary in 1954, well after Erskine noted “there was a great deal of indiscriminate 
shooting” by police and soldiers before his arrival and attempted to reform some of the 
police practices, that the police were notorious for their “brutality and malpractice,” often 
using their rifles as a first resort.194  The police would sometimes strap the bodies of dead 
insurgents, as they did in Malaya, to the hoods and roofs of vehicles—simultaneously 
showing resolve to the noncombatants and warning other insurgents of their fate.195  The 
white policemen and, to a lesser extent, some army units routinely employed torture in 
the interrogation of suspects; most soldiers did not speak the language, so they turned 
their captives over to police, knowing that the latter would be ill-treated; the more benign 
tactics involved death threats, gunshots near the prisoner, forcing the prisoner into stress 
positions, or beating metal buckets placed over the prisoners’ heads.196  Other abuses 
ranged from regular beatings, with some detainees rendered crippled as a result; threats of 
castration; prisoners being placed into earthen pits then partially buried; and, 
occasionally, rape.197  Prosecutions for abuse that resulted in death were infrequent, as 
the Attorney General would find evidence from coroners’ reports for assault charges but 
not murder or manslaughter; this reduction in the charges brought against policemen for 
killing detainees occurred at least 41 times in the course of the counterinsurgency, but the 
                                                 
193 French, The British Way, 156; Bennett, “The Other Side of the COIN,” 649–650. 
194 Bennett, “The Other Side,” 648–649, 651. 
195 French, The British Way, 152.   
196 Ibid., 158 
197 David Anderson, “British Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counter-insurgency, 1952–1960,”  Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 23, no. 4–5 (September 2012), 702, 704–705, 708. 
 65
remaining charges against policemen and soldiers for mishandling detainees were 
dropped in 1957 when London and Nairobi passed Regulation 17 of the Emergency 
Regulations in July—the regulation rendered “compelling force” and “punitive force” 
committed in the routine handling of prisoners lawful.198  The Attorney General and 
Governor Baring were not overly concerned with the allegations of prisoner abuse and 
deaths becoming public knowledge by “biased journalists” because of the detention 
camps’ remoteness in Kenya.199  Emergency regulations gave a pass to soldiers as well:  
[military forces] were ordered to report the deaths of any Mau Mau 
suspects they had killed to the nearest magistrate, but ‘Provided they 
report any casualties inflicted on the enemy as soon as they can to the 
Police, the Police will then inform a magistrate who will accept the report 
and, unless there are exceptional circumstances, will degree that no 
inquest is necessary. The case is then legally closed and no subsequent 
charges can affect the issue.’200  
In effect, while Erskine did not approve of crown forces’ ill treatment of prisoners, 
emergency regulations provided a de facto legalization of torture and extrajudicial 
killings. With little threat of the media creating a public debacle, the practice continued 
with no regard to “alienating the population,” which is the leitmotif accompanying 
minimum force.    
The influence of the Palestinian policemen and soldiers recruited into the Kenya 
Police affected the organizational structure in addition to the importation of coercive 
lessons learned from previous insurgencies. In 1948, Kenyan police forces created the 
“emergency company” that functioned similar to ADRIC in Ireland in terms of an 
autonomous offensive unit. In 1953, it was renamed the General Service Unit (GSU) and 
organized like the Palestine Police Mobile Force, with the same mission to serve as a 
mounted “strike force” consisting of 32 platoons, with 1,100 men in total—equipment 
mirrored that of the PPMF with “Bren guns, rifles, 2-inch mortars and small arms.”201  
Commissioner of Police, Richard Catling, mandated that no policeman could serve more 
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than two years in the GSU, out of fear that the police force was becoming too militarized; 
however, this may have had the opposite effect on the regular force, as the GSU was 
utilized in a far more offensive capacity than the standard police, and recycled policemen 
undoubtedly retained some of their GSU habits after reintegration—even if they weren’t 
part of the Palestinian police originally.202  
In the examination of the regular and auxiliary military’s behavior, Huw Bennett 
and Rod Thornton have clashed in dueling articles about what constitutes “British” forces 
and how that definition influences the evaluation of minimum force practice in Kenya.203  
Thornton would exempt African units such as the King’s Africa Rifles (KAR) while 
Bennett considers their behavior in the “British” totality because of their training by 
white British officers and NCOs, even if such units were not commanded by white 
British officers, as Frank Kitson points out in Bunch of Five.204  If minimum force were 
truly a central tenet of the British military—as Thornton and Mockaitis repeated claim—
then the KAR’s trainers would have instilled that virtue into the KAR’s recruits, or the 
British officers commanding some of the locally raised forces would have prevented 
excesses in the use of force. Bennett maintains that even seconded officers serving in the 
KAR are not exempt from the putative minimum force standard, so the actions of those 
regiments are not exempt from consideration in the minimum force debate.205  The 
number of ethnically British officers serving in the KAR favors Bennett’s interpretation:   
Most officers in the KAR were seconded from British battalions for two or 
three years, and during the national service era, the KAR could afford to 
select high quality candidates as it proved a popular choice. The point is 
reinforced by analysing the numbers of British Army officers on 
secondment in the KAR during the Emergency’s opening phase. At the 
Emergency’s declaration in October 1952, 9 Lieutenant-Colonels, 47 
Majors, 72 Captains, 22 Lieutenants and one Chaplain, 4th Class, from the 
British Army were placed in King’s African Rifles units. They came from 
regiments,  such as the Durham Light Infantry, the Essex Regiment, the 
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Buffs and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. By December, the number 
of British officers on secondment had risen to 223, drawn from regiments 
such as the Sherwood Foresters the Royal Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineers, the Glosters and the Dorsets. In April 1953, the number had 
risen again—to 227, including 57 Captains, from units such as the Royal 
Hampshires, the Somerset Light Infantry, and the Surreys. The staff 
officers running the whole operation (a Lieutenant-General, two 
Brigadiers, three Colonels, ten Lieutenant-Colonels and five Majors) all 
came from the regular army too.206 
Thornton’s insistence that Africans cannot be held to the same standard as British 
soldiers, despite similar training, is not necessarily racist, as Bennett suggests. However, 
it does raise questions regarding the degree to which minimum force was “drilled into 
soldiers,” to borrow a phrase from Mockaitis.207  If the Africans in the KAR employed 
British military tactics but not minimum force, the latter was not prevalent during 
training. If minimum force was not prevalent during training, it is not central to British 
counterinsurgency. When minimum force is discussed at all during the Kenyan 
campaign, it follows the relative minimum force advocated by Sir Charles Gwynn. The 
commander of the 39th Infantry Brigade comprised of units of the Buffs, Devons, and 
Lancashire Fusiliers, issued rules of engagement in 1953: “The principle of the 
‘minimum force necessary’ must apply in all circumstances and each of the cases 
described below. This principle is not really restrictive in fact the minimum force 
necessary might be the maximum force a soldier or party of soldiers could muster.”208  
Despite this proclamation of relative minimum force, the military in Kenya employed 
“special areas” or “prohibited areas” that function as modern free-fire areas (as they did 
in Palestine, then Malaya), in which lethal force is authorized without warning (following 
Governor Baring’s abrogation of the requirement in 1953), regardless of whether the 
target or targets are armed or unarmed.209  Free-fire areas are anathema to minimum 
force doctrine, even as Gwynn described it. Bennett points out that “a truly minimum 
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force policy would have instructed troops to try and capture those fleeing first, and to fire 
only as a last resort.”210  Mockaitis claims that such instances of force employed in these 
prohibited areas, such as the bombing of the Aberdares Forest and the Mount Kenya 
Preserve, were subject to “rules of conventional engagement not the common law 
principle of minimum force,” although he previously argued in British 
Counterinsurgency that minimum force was the default rule of engagement for all 
military operations as early as the Arab Revolt in 1936.211  Mockaitis claims Erskine 
adhered to minimum force doctrine in allowing bombing in these areas simply because 
the latter claimed, “This is absolutely fair because nobody is supposed to be in the 
prohibited area.”212  Similarly, Stephan Chappell argues that the RAF helped to win 
hearts and minds of the neutral population with this bombing campaign, as it avoided 
civilian casualties by bombing only the prohibited areas.213  Of course, this claim is 
unknowable. Designating an area as prohibited does not prevent noncombatants from 
traversing it, and pilots could not know if those traversing the prohibited areas were Mau 
Mau insurgents or unaffiliated foragers.   In fact, Mockaitis admits Kenyan women were 
likely shot in these prohibited areas while looking for food in the Fort Hall district.214 
The use of exemplary force and coercion by the army was greater on the ground 
than it was from the air, and while the temptation for many historians to blame white 
settlers for the bulk of the violence is convenient, the explanation does not account for 
why the British military and police would buckle under the political pressure from the 
white settlers in Kenya and therefore abandon minimum force doctrine, if it existed in 
practice.215  In Kenya, Erskine decided to mimic the Malayan plan of forced relocation. 
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The tasked was rendered more difficult, however, by the Kikuyu’s proclivity for 
dispersed dwellings in lieu of more tightly knit villages.216  In addition to creating village 
areas for the Kikuyu, Erskine wanted to “lock down” the tribe’s land, detaining everyone 
even suspected of supporting the Mau Mau.217  Instead of the Malayan standard village 
model and food controls, two types of villages were erected: one for the loyalists and 
Home Guards, and another type of distinctly punitive village for suspected Mau Mau 
supporters that would incorporate collective punishments, food controls, and bars from 
travelling to or trading with adjacent population centers.218  This process followed the 
largest cordon and search operation, ANVIL, during which approximately 24,100 
Kenyans (half the Kikuyu population) were detained without trial and deported back to 
the Reserves at gunpoint, to begin the “villagization” process and a new life behind 
barbed wire and scarce resources.219  The areas outside the villages were designated free-
fire areas, as discussed previously. The numbers of Kikuyu forcibly resettled into 
punitive villages greatly overshadowed those in Malaya: 
Forced resettlement represented a massive demographic dislocation. In 
Malaya about 423,000 Chinese squatters were moved into 410 new 
villages, and about 650,000 Chinese mind and estate workers were subject 
to “regrouping” in wired-in villages. As the total Chinese population in 
Malay amounted to 2,153,000 according to the 1953 census, the 1,073,000 
people forcibly relocated represented almost exactly half of the Chinese 
population of the country. The proportion of the target population moved 
in Kenya was even larger. Between June 1954 and October 1955, from a 
total target population of 1,555,000 (Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu) as 
measured by the 1948 census, about 1,077,500 people, or 69 per cent, 
were forcibly moved to one of the 854 new villages.220 
These actions against the Kikuyu were not conducted by white vigilante settlers, but 
those of the British government in Kenya. The combination of forced relocation, mass 
indefinite detention during cordon and search operations, the subsequent abuse at the 
                                                 
216 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 129–130. 
217 French, The British Way, 118.   
218 Ibid., 119.   
219 Newsinger, “Minimum Force and the Mau Mau Rebellion,” 49; French, The British Way, 116–120. 
220 French, The British Way, 120.   
 70
hands of white British police in the detention camps, food controls, and collective 
punishments in the specifically punitive villages overshadows the levels of coercion by 
the British in Malaya, without the palliative declarations of a hearts and minds campaign 
involving public services. The brutality of the KPR, however, compounds the coercive 
force used by the British government in Kenya, given the fact that the white settlers were 
legitimized by the government in an attempt to rein in the settlers’ behavior.221  
Minimum force primacy advocates like Mockaitis, Newsinger, and Thornton would 
transfer the minimum force violations, and the notable absence of a magnanimous hearts 
and minds campaign, that supposedly alienated the population to the settlers, when the 
systemic violence of villagization and prohibited areas organized by Baring and Erskine 
constituted the majority of the excessive force in Kenya.   
At the end of the counterinsurgency in Kenya, however, despite talk of absolute 
minimum force being central to retaining the loyalty of the target population, Frank 
Kitson saw merit in the “threats of unpleasantness on a nationwide scale. There seemed 
to be something in this point worth writing about and arising out of it were such subjects 
as population control and the resettlement of communities in the interests of security.”222  
Despite the noticeable lack of minimum force in Kenya, the counterinsurgency campaign 
has been deemed a success. Erskine won the conflict because he imitated Briggs in 
Malaya, not the more benign depictions of Templer, who was almost as coercive as 
Briggs. Once again, the separation of the population from insurgents and denying the 
former’s support for the latter in terms of materiel and intangible aid proved the 
determining factor. British forces’ ability to wage “conventional war” against insurgents 
in the free-fire areas after the villagization process ran a close second. To say the army 
was less brutal than the police, who were less brutal than the white settlers or Kikuyu 
Home Guards does not show that minimum force doctrine was present, much less that it 
was crucial to victory. During the Kenyan campaign, Mockaitis points to the decrease of 
excessive force against noncombatants starting in 1954 as proof that minimum force was, 
“in theory,” present in the strategic and operational execution. However, as the Kikuyu 
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population was largely deported to new villages where the British could control 
everything from food supplies to the movements of individuals in and between villages. 
In this way, they could claim that offensive action was taking place only outside of the 
major population centers, hence minimum force doctrine remained the rule.   
E. CYPRUS 
The final putative victory of the immediate post-war counterinsurgencies came in 
Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots ended British colonial rule, but failed to achieve enosis 
(merging with Greece), which the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots, who made up 20 per 
cent of the population, adamantly opposed. Nevertheless, many historians consider the 
British effort there a success for preventing the Greek annexation of Cyprus, despite the 
fact that the British military forces were thereafter relegated to their base areas. The 
British were poorly placed to conduct a hearts and minds campaign, as nearly 80 per cent 
of the population – that is, all of the Greek Cypriots—wanted enosis. At the beginning of 
hostilities, the British were unaware of how popular the movement really was, and how 
much the enemy commander, Colonel Geogrios Grivas, had prepared for the struggle.223  
The Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (EOKA), as the military wing of the enosis 
effort, and its supports were poorly organized, equipped, and trained.224 Field Marshal 
Sir John Harding was, like Templer, both military commander and governor—a 
“supremo.”  The political situation was atypical vis-à-vis the other wars of 
decolonialization because the target population was not, in the view of the Colonial 
Office, a collection of what Callwell would have called “savages.”  Frank Kitson 
recounts the presence of media as a possible factor in the treatment of Cypriots: “One of 
the results of the fighting in Cyprus was that many journalists descended on the island. 
They mostly lived in the largest and most luxurious hotel in Nicosia waiting eagerly for 
incidents to report.”225  Harding requested permission to employ standard collective 
punishments in Cyprus, and the Colonial Office begrudgingly allowed it, stating, “The 
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arguments against its use in Cyprus are that it is inappropriate to use such a tribal method 
against a more developed people.” The British government was also concerned, to a 
lesser extent, that such methods would “alienate other sections of Cypriots, in a way that 
strict enforcement of the law would not.”226  This differing attitude about the Cypriots 
would manifest itself in the insistence on a civil policing method to a degree unseen in 
Malaya and Kenya. While Harding wanted the police to be “involved in army-style 
operations,” the Colonial Office wanted to export the metropolitan civil policing model 
once again. John Biles, the Deputy Commissioner of Police in Cyprus, quickly resigned 
after the emergency began because “political interference” with police operations and 
personnel by the Colonial Office to export Britishness to the colony “made the job of 
colonial policemen untenable.”227  Because the police force was in disarray, gathering 
information regarding the enemy’s disposition and composition was inhibited, and 
Harding had to spend the first phase of the emergency in 1955 rebuilding the defunct 
organization, which was largely completed by July of 1956.228   
The military and police under Harding were neither gentle in their treatment of 
Cypriots nor content with small-unit operations against insurgent cells. Between 
December of 1956 and March of 1957, the British delivered what Grivas called “hard 
blows” in conducting large operations resulting in mass arrests and detentions; by 
February 1957, only 69 insurgents were killed by security forces, but the number of 
insurgent units was diminished by British estimates from 16 to 5.229  One example of 
large initial operations used to disperse the insurgency in Cyprus occurred in October of 
1956, with a clearing operation called Sparrowhawk, which covered approximately 200 
square miles in the Kyrenia Mountains, “uncovering arms and ammunition, including a 
machine gun, ammunition bombs, bedding, and food and capturing a gang of six men, 
including Pliotis Christofi, a gang leader with a £5,000 reward on his head.”230  
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Harding’s Director of Operations, Brigadier General Baker, believed that his mission was 
“to bring home to the ordinary people the hard fact that the results of terrorism include 
hardship to themselves and so to create conditions predisposing people in favor of a 
political settlement,” even if such collective punishments were “contrary to the principles 
held by civilized countries of individual responsibility and the rule of law, [and] are 
regarded as illiberal by the free world.”231  Harding himself shared this view, claiming he 
wanted to strike “the balance of fear, fear of punishment by the court, fear of defeat by 
the security forces, on the one hand, and fear of retribution or punishment by the EOKA 
on the other hand.”  On the subject of collective punishments, Harding said, “Apart from 
their intrinsic justification, one of the results of the various measures such as collective 
fines, curfews and other restrictions that have recently been increased is the restoration of 
respect for authority.”232  Harding’s view, and that of his subordinate, seems to have 
derived from the initial failure to produce results in intelligence or popular support 
following the announcement in 1955 of a 38 million pound development plan.233  The 
collective punishments came hard on the heels of that failed public bribery attempt, as 
Harding’s government collected 108,000 pounds in 17 collective fines over the next 
year.234  Despite viewing common punishments such as curfews and business closures as 
sufficient for the adult population, Harding ran into a peculiar problem with the Greek 
Cypriot youth, whom Grivas recruited early. The youth would spit on security forces or 
assault them with rocks, so Harding had them detained and caned for the offenses.235  
Cordon and search operations sometimes served both offensive and punitive functions in 
Cyprus. In “British Counter-Insurgency in Cyprus,” Simon Robbins explains: 
. . . following the shooting of a policeman in Nicosia, troops wired off the 
area, set up posts on rooftops, and searched every house. They then closed 
that part of the city, 31 houses and 20 shops, for three months, evicting the 
inhabitants with what they could carry, leaving them homeless, 
unemployed, and bankrupt. The first collective punishment of £2,000 was 
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imposed on 4 December 1955 at Lefkoniko after the village post office 
had been blown up. Other collective fines levied £35,000 from Limassol 
and £40,000 from Famagusta in September 1956, as punishment for 
failing to cooperate with the security forces and refusing to reveal useful 
information. On two occasions, the occupants of houses and shop, which 
were suspected of being used by the insurgents, were evicted and the 
property either destroyed or requisitioned.236 
If the village names were Irish instead of Greek and the fines lower, one would not be 
able to tell to which conflict these anecdotes belonged, given the degree of Black and 
Tan-inspired violence. The phrase, “shot while trying to escape,” had become so 
prevalent in Cyprus that the Colonial Secretary asked the government in Cyprus to verify 
the veracity of the reports, stating, “there seems to have been barely even the pretence 
that it was true.”237  The Cypriots alleged the usual horrors were being committed by 
British forces against insurgents and noncombatants under arrest, and some of the 
allegations were supported by evidence, such as the six deaths during interrogation, and 
prisoners showing the physicals signs of abuse.238  A soldier with the 2nd Battalion 
Parachute Regiment stated, “Special Branch . . . were bastards. They really knocked these 
blokes about; I could hear them crying. None of us liked this but I have to admit the 
terrorists talked.”239  Coroner reports in 1958 following a reprisal resulting in mass 
arrests following the death of a soldier’s wife at the hands of insurgents stated that “a 
degree of force that would appear to be entirely unjustified was used by security 
forces.”240  A soldier involved in that reprisal wrote to his father, saying 
I suppose you heard on the radio about all the trouble we had in Mafagusta 
last Friday. About the two women being shot, one dead and the other very 
ill. The troops were called out . . . they gave the Greeks a hell of a time. 
The troops just went mad. There was no order for the first two hours. The 
officers could not control them. I suppose heard what the Mayor of 
Famagusta said, ‘250 injured,’ and I’ll bet most of them had their heads 
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split open. The lads all had riot sticks. In the first two hours they hit every 
Greek Male they could lay their hands on.241 
This reprisal differs significantly with those committed by the RIC and soldiers during 
the Troubles, insofar as the officers in Ireland were usually quick to regain control of 
their men and usher them back to the barracks. Conversely, another soldier in Cyprus 
reported that he and his fellow soldiers were “conscious that whenever we picked up 
people they would then try to either damage themselves or pretend that you had damaged 
them”; the soldiers therefore took special care in writing reports on the matter in the 
attempt to clear themselves of wrong-doing.242  Some of the EOKA’s propaganda 
intimates a degree of truth to detainees feigning injury for political purposes, but the 
substantiated claims render those falsehoods irrelevant in the analysis of British behavior 
in Cyprus.    
In Cyprus, like Malaya and Kenya, the British government publicly claimed an 
adherence to minimum force doctrine consistent with democratic principles. The 
Secretary of State for War, Christopher Soames, stated in the same speech to the 
Commons in 1958 that “it is known by every soldier in Cyprus that, whatever action he is 
called upon to take, he has to do it with the minimum of force . . . . We must never forget 
that the role of the security forces is to conquer terrorism, and there will be many 
incidents when the minimum Force necessary will be quite a lot of force.”243  Secretary 
Soames alluded to Gwynn’s caveat that minimum force doctrine is relative to the 
situation and not an absolute minimum degree of force—a statement that was rare 
coming from Cabinet members given their aversion to large operations resulting in 
multiple casualties or weapon systems possessing great destructive potential. The soldiers 
and police in Cyprus, however, acted in manner incongruent with minimum force often 
enough and with sufficient severity when they did to conclude that even relative 
minimum force was abandoned more than it was followed.   
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This thesis has argued that the historical record fails to support the assertion by 
practitioners like Templer, Thompson, and Kitson and some historians, among them 
Mockaitis and Nagl, that minimum force has been a central pillar of British 
counterinsurgency theory and practice. Templer insisted that his “hearts and minds” 
campaign, consisting primarily of benign treatment and the provision of public services 
to increase the standard of living and therefore show the targeted population that the 
government is its benefactor and friend was responsible for British success in Malaya. 
Thompson and Kitson likewise claimed minimum force was responsible—in whole or 
part—for the victories in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. A closer examination, however, 
shows a liberal use of exemplary force, to include collective punishments, large screening 
operations with loose fire discipline, extra-judicial killings, and detention camps that 
violated the human rights of all involved, to have been the mainstays of British 
counterinsurgency methods that the British ignored as best they could. While Thomas 
Mockaitis concludes that minimum force doctrine was practiced throughout the 
decolonialization period, his British Counterinsurgency 1919–60 lists numerous 
exceptions to minimum force in each campaign. Nevertheless, he treats these instances as 
anomalies—crimes committed by inexperienced or vengeful soldiers who were nearly 
always punished by the military leadership. In fact, violations of IHL were not only 
tolerated by the civil and military hierarchy. They were frequently encouraged by a 
British government whose 1939 Emergency Powers Act gave colonial governments wide 
powers to prosecute counterinsurgencies free of due process concerns, delayed 
ratification of the 1948 Geneva Human Rights Convention for almost a decade, or sought 
legal loopholes in the European convention of Human Rights to give their colonial 
soldiers and policemen a free hand to ignore IHL constraints. Commanders justified the 
requirement to ignore legal constraints or interpret their powers liberally as a requirement 
to keep discipline among the forces of order, who would surely take matters into their 
own hands unless insurgents and their supporters were dealt with summarily. Templer 
continued use the concentration “villages” in Malaya that Briggs had created. The barbed 
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wire, armed guards, guard towers, collective punishments, and food controls ensured that 
the villagers could not support the insurgency for long even if they were inclined to do 
so. Winning “hearts and minds” was the least of the government’s concerns. The Kenyan 
campaign was modeled after Malaya, but surely exceeded it in brutality. Thousands died, 
mostly Kikuyu, but the media was largely absent, or somewhat complicit when present, 
as Thompson recounted in Defeating Communist Insurgency. In both Malaya and Kenya, 
the object of defeating insurgents who were ethnic minorities was made easier because 
violence could be applied to them without raising the ire of the majority. If the Chinese 
immigrants or Kikuyu were causing trouble, their mistreatment and deaths meant little to 
those who saw them as the Other—by both the indigenous population and the security 
forces themselves. In Cyprus, we also see the impact of racial attitudes, as greater care 
was taken by crown forces to commit less violence against those who were racially closer 
to the white Europeans, although the soldiers and police still had a few larks in “bashing 
wogs” when they weren’t implementing Black and Tan tactics. The United Nations’ 
involvement in Cyprus, coupled with the political dynamics of the Cold War which 
required that Britain appease Greece, a NATO ally, accounted for the diminished, 
although consistent, levels of coercion in Cyprus more than racial attitudes, which were 
still bad.   
Others have taken the myth of minimum force, despite baseless claims about its 
affect, and imposed the concept on a rubric with which to evaluate subsequent 
counterinsurgencies. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John Nagl presents two 
methods of counterinsurgency: total annihilation and gaining the popular support of the 
people.244  He cites Thompson and Kitson as proponents of minimum force, which he 
defines as one of five essential counterinsurgency components.245  His prescription, 
based on the victory in Malaya consists of whether doctrine is conducive to victory, the 
military establishes goals to achieve it, there is unity of command, minimum force is 
used, and the military is organized for the threat.246  Creating counterinsurgency 
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prescriptions is nothing new, of course. Callwell, Gwynn, Simson, Thompson, Galula, 
Kitson, and others have made significant, influential contributions to strategy for 
counterinsurgency wars (although there was nothing limited about Callwell’s approach). 
While Mockaitis argues that the use of coercive force significantly changed for the 
British after the experiences of Amritsar and Ireland, there is little evidence that this was 
so. Population resettlement in concentration camps, free fire zones, calorie control, 
indefinite internment, prisoner mistreatment, summary executions and disappearances 
remained staples of British counterinsurgency strategies at least through Kenya, with the 
aid of complicit jurists and officials.247 When Nagl claims victory goes to the 
counterinsurgent force that learns to adapt based on his principles derived from British 
experience, he is only partially correct.248 British counterinsurgency successes were 
either achieved through a political solution, like Palestine in 1939, Malaya to degree, or 
Cyprus, or were “won” with a degree of violence and a violation of IHL that hardly 
brings credit to the counterinsurgent, much less supports the concept of minimum force.    
It may be true that Amritsar and the Troubles served as transitions in British 
counterinsurgency theory between small wars of the 19th century and colonial 
policing/COIN of the 20th. However, many of the methods remained the same. In Ireland, 
reprisals for insurgent violence carried out against the population considered, rightly or 
not, to be complicit were common. The military and civil leadership sympathized with 
the soldiers and policemen conducting them and provided legal cover. Indeed, their 
argument was that, if they failed to become complicit in such behavior, then the reprisals 
would only grow worse and military and police discipline would be in jeopardy of 
collapse. The security forces hit the population in the pocketbook, destroying businesses 
key to their economic survival—mainly general stores and creameries. House 
demolitions created fear that caused many land-owners to discourage the IRA from 
ambushing patrols near their property. Extra-judicial killings became common when the 
local courts could not function because of insurgent intimidation of jurors and justices. 
Small unit tactics took the place of large scale drives after the latter dispersed the enemy 
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formations or compelled them to operate in smaller numbers. The British created their 
own flying columns, which defeated much the IRA, who then regressed to common 
terrorism, just as Grivas was later forced to do for the same reasons in Cyprus. The RIC 
and the RUC passed these lessons on to colonial police operating throughout the empire 
in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and elsewhere. In each subsequent 
counterinsurgency, the police and soldiers at the tactical, operational, and occasionally 
strategic levels believed that the proverbial stick produced results when the carrot failed, 
if they bothered with the pretense of the carrot at all.   
The pretense of hearts and minds became necessary as domestic and international 
opinion coalesced with international humanitarian law in the wake of Nazi atrocities in 
World War II in the name of counterinsurgency. The British avoided the restrictions 
imposed by Geneva and the ECHR as long as possible, then simply refused to comply 
thereafter, posing legal objections to various provisions that would curb the scope of 
force against civilians. Despite the rhetoric from the British government, at both state and 
colonial levels, this evasion of IHL was evidence that a commitment to minimum force 
and prosecuting counterinsurgency operations within the confines of the law was merely 
rhetorical. Free fire zones, the use of air power against insurgents and their supporters are 
not consistent with minimum force doctrine. Occasionally, the British government 
dispensed with any pretense to minimum force altogether—in 1964, the British took a 
page out of Callwell’s Small Wars in the Radfan area north of Aden, where the goal was 
to create a famine through destruction if they “could not break the link between the 
insurgents and their supporters by placing the latter in wired-in villages” because the 
geography prevented it.249  The air campaign, designed to raze villages and destroy crops 
to starve the people, consisted of “600 air sorties, fired 2,500 rockets and 200,000 cannon 
shells, and the Royal Artillery  fired 20,000 rounds of artillery ammunition,” to target “a 
whole ethnic group and [transform] them into refugees.”250  The plan in Oman was 
similar, but the population acquiesced before the British destroyed them:  
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. . . after locally raised troops had sealed off the dissident areas, aircraft 
would make demonstration flights and drop warning leaflets to intimidate 
them. Phase two would consist of more warning leaflets intended to give 
the dissidents a chance to get clear of the target area, followed by attacks 
on three forts, which were obvious military objectives. If that failed to 
induce them to surrender, air power would be used to impose a form of 
population control over the insurgents and their supporters. Aircraft would 
destroy civil society on the Jebel Akhdar by targeting the water supply of 
selected villages and by making it impossible for farmers to gather their 
harvest. The final phase would be implemented only if earlier operations 
did not bring the insurgents to heel. It would consist of what [Air Vice 
Marshal] Heath euphemistically called the “denial of selected villages by 
ultimatum under threat of air attack.”  What he meant was that, after yet 
another round of warning leaflets, the RAF would bomb the villages.251 
This tactic would give the British government pause in approving similar measures later 
in the Radfan air campaign, but continued insurgent resistance there and the desire to end 
the conflict quickly engendered approval by the Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys.252   
As discussed earlier, Mockaitis claimed minimum force pertained to all military 
and police operations—the doctrine was “drilled into them”—by the time of the Arab 
Revolt in 1936. But 30 years later, the British government had regressed to a Small Wars 
mindset vis-à-vis the use of force.  One could argue that excessive force accounted for the 
failure of the British to achieve their goals in Oman and the Radfan, because it alienated 
the people. But because the British could not relocate the population as they had earlier in 
Malaya and Kenya, they resorted to air power and intimidation in an attempt to achieve 
their goals, one more example of the use of excessive force as a major tool in the 
counterinsurgency toolbox. More importantly, the operations deemed unequivocal 
successes immediately following Palestine—namely, Malaya and Kenya—displayed no 
more minimum force in practice than those before them. Therefore, minimum force 
cannot be considered a central element in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice, based 
on those British experiences. 
If minimum force cannot be included in the prescription for successful 
counterinsurgency, the only remaining factors consist of separating the population from 
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the insurgents and controlling the former’s behavior. This method allowed the British 
military and police, more than anything else, to defeat the insurgents in conventional 
combat outside of the newly established population centers. Popular support, hearts and 
minds, was not won through the careful application of lethality or the promise of a better 
life should the government prevail. It was not won at all.   
Even if population control is the key to success, it still may not apply to all 
insurgencies, especially the most recent ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, which questions 
the validity of any counterinsurgency prescription based on British experience given the 
restrictions placed on Western nations’ militaries by international law. Could the U.S. 
Army have displaced the millions of inhabitants in Baghdad, Iraq and placed them into 
new villages in the Anbar province?  It would have been a herculean, if not quixotic, 
effort. The most powerful insurgent group in Iraq, Jaysh al Mahdi, came from the Shiite 
majority, as opposed to the ethnic minorities in Malaya and Kenya from whom the 
insurgents drew strength.253  In many respects, however, ethnic cleansing and refugee 
flows have become the new form of concentration camps, while drones offer the latest 
application of air power in counterinsurgency to intimidate the population and the 
realization of free fire zones. 
After Nagl deployed to Iraq, he intimated that his own counterinsurgency 
paradigm was inapplicable. After recounting the problems he and his unit faced in 
gaining the population’s trust, he wrote, “It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to 
suggest that, on their own, foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can 
hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them.”254  He 
prevented any dissonance with his book’s thesis by rationalizing that the British in 
Malaya had been present for over a decade, so they had enough time to build a bond with 
the people.255  Apparently, that trust was insufficient, as the British felt compelled to 
corral the Chinese into camps to prevent them from supporting the communists.   
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While the popular conception of minimum force has evolved over time to fit the 
changing attitudes about the role and acceptable targets of force in counterinsurgency, the 
victories in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus cannot be attributed to either the relative or 
absolute versions of minimum force. The British clearly violated both variants, although 
the relative minimum force advocated by Sir Charles Gwynn in Imperial Policing was far 
more prevalent in the memoirs, letters, and orders issued by officers at the regimental 
level and below, as well as some policemen. The colonial police, as an institution, refused 
to allow senior officials to implement the civil policing model—the reality of colonial 
policing required, in the policeman’s view, a more mobile force with greater lethality to 
force compliance on the population rather than to gain its trust. Police walking a beat 
with batons would not suffice. The policing methods inherited through the RIC and later 
the Palestine Police were not conducive to winning hearts and minds. But policemen 
operated on the assumption that the threat of coercive force would intimidate the 
population into submission.   
Lastly, while the racial attitudes of crown forces were backwards by today’s 
standards, the evil did not come simply from the belief that colonial subjects were 
racially and culturally inferior and worthy of contempt. The underlying assumption of 
colonial policing stemmed from the belief that the respect of indigenous people for the 
colonial power could be guaranteed only by fear of serious reprisals should they step out 
of line. Experience dating at least from the Indian Mutiny of 1857, taught crown forces 
that such a belief was warranted by the effects brutal methods had on the population, 
even in conflicts the British ultimately lost. To the security forces, losses were political—
never tactical—and the national or colonial authorities served only to restrain the strong 
hand the population required for order. By doing this, they risks losing control. Palestine 
was seen as a victory won by successful counterinsurgency tactics, while Ireland came to 
be viewed as a tactical victory squandered by Westminster. What they failed to realize 
was that it was the brutality of their tactics there that convinced London that the prize was 
not worth winning under such circumstances. Only rarely were soldiers troubled by the 
brutality their fellows were imposing on the people. Tactics took primacy over strategy in 
counterinsurgency, and they were seldom, if ever, applied with minimum force.   
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